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Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy:
Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low
M. Todd Henderson†
Conventional wisdom suggests that high agency costs explain the (excessive) amounts
and (inefficient) forms of CEO compensation. This paper offers a simple empirical
test of this claim and the reform proposals that follow from it, by looking at pay
practices in firms under financial distress, where agency costs are dramatically
reduced. When a firm files for Chapter 11 or privately works out its debt with lenders,
sophisticated investors consolidate ownership interests into a few large positions
replacing diffuse and disinterested shareholders. These investors, be they banks or
vulture investors, effectively control the debtor during the reorganization process. In
addition, all the other players in compensation decisions—boards, courts, and other
stakeholders—play a much more active role than for healthy firms. In other words,
agency costs are much lower in Chapter 11 firms. Accordingly, if pay practices look
the same in bankruptcy as they do in healthy firms, we can conclude that either (1)
the current practices are efficient, or (2) that proposals to change executive
compensation by reducing agency costs are incomplete. The data support one of these
hypotheses: amounts and forms of compensation remain largely unchanged as agency
costs are reduced, and look similar to those of healthy firms.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The ongoing and increasingly vociferous debate about executive compensation boils
down to a simple question of whether current compensation practices are a solution to the agency
problem created by the separation of ownership and control in large public companies, or rather
attempts by powerful managers to extract rents from under-incentivized owners—that is,
evidence of the agency problem itself.1 Legions of academic articles in the law, finance, and
economics literature have offered theoretical and empirical evidence in support of both sides of
this debate without resolution. In fact, an entire issue of the Journal of Corporation Law was
recently devoted to the book-length critique of executive compensation by Bebchuk and Fried.2
The book claims that managers abuse the power of their office to extract rents from the
corporation, and that the solution is an increased monitoring role for boards and/or large,
institutional shareholders. In other words, reducing agency costs will lead to lower and/or
different forms of executive compensation.
This paper offers a test of this critique and proposed reform by examining compensation
practices in firms under financial distress, where agency costs are dramatically reduced as
sophisticated investors consolidate ownership interests and assert significant control over firms
in precisely the way critics propose will solve the pay problem for all firms. If compensation
practices remain largely unchanged in these cases, one might conclude that existing practices are
by and large efficient or, at the very least, that proposed reforms to increase the role of boards or
institutional investors as the way to reduce managerial rent seeking are misplaced or incomplete.
The data support this hypothesis. We will see that employment contracts written in bankruptcy
by sophisticated investors with large, controlling stakes in the debtor look nearly identical in
form and amount to those written in higher agency costs environments. In other words, reducing
agency costs does not cause material changes in the fundamental nature of compensation
bargains.
***
There are two competing schools in the current executive compensation debate. The socalled “optimal contracting” school views typical compensation packages as fair and efficient
bargains struck between principals (various “owners”) and agents (management). In this theory,
employment contracts are designed to align incentives among corporate participants with
different risk profiles and investments in the firm, and various market forces (for labor, for
products, for control) constrain managerial rent seeking. These forces create a negotiation
dynamic that approximates arm’s-length bargaining between managers and owners.
Critics – the so-called “managerial power” school – believe that CEOs are often overpaid
and inefficiently paid, and that pay practices represent a taking advantage of, rather than a

1

“See ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 123 (1932); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 308 (1976).”
2
See Symposium on “Pay Without Performance”, 30 J. CORP. LAW 647-855 (2005); see also LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
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solution to, the agency problems in large, public firms.3 According to this theory, managers are
able to extract significant rents because distant, diffuse, and/or disinterested shareholders are
unable or unwilling to discipline managers, and because the board is captured and manipulated
by the CEO. CEOs accomplish this by selecting sympathetic board members, and then using a
variety of monetary rewards and psychological pressures to make the board a mere
instrumentality of the CEO’s will, especially when it comes to compensation decisions. The
obvious solution that follows is to weaken the power of CEOs by partially or completely
reuniting “ownership” and “control.” The mechanism proposed for achieving this reunification is
empowering either large shareholders (typically so-called “institutional investors”) or directors to
play a more active role in the management of the firm as a counterpoise to management power.
In both cases, the core idea is to increase the power of shareholders vis-à-vis managers.
With respect to institutional investors, the belief is that if the firm’s capital providers are
of sufficient size and sophistication, they will have greater incentives to monitor and discipline
otherwise greedy, rent-seeking executives.4 This type of reform maps well onto the general
agency theory in the modern corporation, with the 100 percent owner-operated firm on one end
of the spectrum and the manager-operated (perhaps dominated) public corporation with
thousands of small shareholders on the other end. The theory suggests that, all other things being
equal, managers’ ability to extract rents from shareholders increases significantly as one moves
along the spectrum in the direction of the manager-operated/dominated firm. The more passive
shareholders are, so the argument goes, the more CEOs will be paid and/or the more inefficient
compensation forms will be used, allowing both high pay in cases of low performance and
camouflage of actual amounts of pay.
Attempts to empower directors to play a more active role in monitoring management, by
mandating independence requirements and so forth, is another example of the proposed reforms.
By freeing the board from the clutches of the CEO, it is argued, true arm’s-length bargaining
over compensation can take place. In this case, the reunification of ownership and control is
achieved through a proxy, that is, the hypothetical disinterested, independent board. The SEC’s
proposed reform allowing shareholders to nominate directors for election under certain
circumstances is one mechanism through which this reunification can be achieved. As former
commissioner Goldschmid lamented at the failure of the SEC to pass the rule, getting owners
more actively involved in policing management “is the single most significant way for investors
to dramatically improve corporate governance,” and without the rule “lazy, ineffective, [and]
grossly overpaid CEOs” will be insulated from necessary oversight.5
This paper tests the managerial power theory by examining a special case where these
proposed reforms are effectively in place and where “owners” are already very active in
monitoring, advising, or even running the firm – that is, firms reorganizing under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code or restructuring their debt in private workouts with large lenders. In both
cases, supposedly ineffective monitors (captured board members or relatively uninformed or
3

See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 785-7 (2002).
4
See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 465-71 (1986).
5
Phyllis Plitch, SEC is Stymied on a Final Rule for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2004, at C3.
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under-motivated shareholders) are replaced by a group of highly sophisticated and motivated
owners with ready access to corporate information, often high levels of involvement in corporate
decision making, and backed up by strong statutory rights and judicial review. As Baird and
Rassmussen recently observed, sophisticated creditors, who are repeat players in corporate
reorganizations, “essentially control[] the corporation” when a firm files to reorganize under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.6 The way that these owners write employment contracts will
tell us something about whether agency costs are the cause of allegedly high levels and
inefficient forms of compensation.
***
While executive compensation articles fill the legal and finance journals, very little work
has been done on compensation at firms in financial distress. In the finance literature, Gilson and
Vetsuypens examined compensation at 77 financially distressed firms from 1981 to 1987. They
concluded that managerial power was substantially weakened in these firms, and that
“compensation policy is often an important part of firms’ overall strategy for dealing with
financial distress.”7 In the legal literature, LoPucki and Whitford looked at corporate governance
practices at 43 large firms that filed for bankruptcy from 1979 to 1988. They concluded that “[i]n
the battle to determine the compensation scheme for management and thereby fix management’s
incentives, [creditor-monitors] are likely to have the upper hand,” in some cases.8 CEO turnover
was also quite high (about 40 percent). But the study claims that some CEOs were able to use
their privileged position as debtor-in-possession to extract wealth in excess of their worth – what
the authors call a “grab.”9
This project aims to update and extend the empirical work, and to test some of the
theoretical predictions about the role agency costs play in determining how and how much
executives are compensated, by examining compensation of chief executive officers of about 80
large, publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt from
1992 to 2003. In section II, the facts about executive compensation and the arguments on both
sides of the agency debate are examined briefly to set the appropriate stage for the theoretical
and empirical contribution of this piece. We will see that the evidence and arguments are
ambiguous, with some aspects of current practice being better explained by optimal contracting
and some by managerial power.
Section III considers the role of large financial creditors in corporate reorganizations and
the burgeoning market for distressed debt, and concludes that these sophisticated investors
assume a powerful role in monitoring and disciplining management of firms in financial distress.
The interplay between these two prior sections is examined in section IV, where we consider the
theory and practice of compensation decisions in firms under financial distress. We will see that
while management is in a statutorily privileged position vis-à-vis creditors in terms of proposing
a reorganization plan and day-to-day running of the firm, the arguments supporting the
6

See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1209, 1231 (2006) (describing Warnaco case).
7
Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48 J.
FIN. 425, 426 (1993).
8
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 711 (1993).
9
Id. at 739.
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managerial power view of labor bargaining are largely absent in financially troubled firms.
Moreover, “recontracting” costs, what could be considered a form of transaction costs, are much
lower in financially distressed firms, allowing for a more equal bargaining footing. The theory
developed follows the work of Shleifer and Vishny10 and Zingales,11 who argue for a theoretical
middle ground that incorporates elements of both managerial power and optimal contracting,
concluding that firms aspire to conduct arm’s-length bargaining over compensation but that
transaction costs prevent continuous recontracting. Finally, we will see that creditors in corporate
reorganizations have significant incentives to bargain over CEO compensation, because of the
importance of (re)setting management incentives needed to capture and expand the firm’s going
concern value.
Section V presents the empirical data on CEO compensation in firms under financial
distress. Although the managerial power theory suggests that the increased monitoring typical in
Chapter 11 cases should lead to lower levels and/or different types of compensation, the data in
this study does not support that conclusion. While overall compensation levels for CEOs falls
slightly in and around the time of financial distress, no firm dramatically altered its
compensation methods despite the reduction in agency costs. In other words, sophisticated
investors with huge stakes in the success of financially distressed firms were no more likely to
press for or successfully implement a sustained reduction in CEO compensation or
fundamentally change the compensation structure in a way critics argue is self-evidently
beneficial to these very investors.
Section VI concludes by considering some implications of these findings. For example,
reform proposals claiming that directors and/or institutional investors would reign in executive
compensation if just given the chance are incomplete. If vulture investors, banks, and creditors’
committees are unwilling or unable to change compensation levels or types, this suggests these
contracts are either efficient or more fundamental reforms are warranted if executive
compensation is a problem.
II. THE LANDSCAPE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

There is no question that the last decade was a good time to be the CEO of a large
American corporation. The average compensation for CEOs of the largest 1500 publicly traded
companies rose from about $2.5 million in 1992 to about $6.5 million in 2003 (in inflationadjusted 2003 dollars), or a growth rate of about 9 percent per year.12 This increase caused a
flurry of academic criticism and hand wringing, as well as proposed bills in Congress to limit the
pay of executives.13 As a typical article opined: “Executive compensation is the cancer of
10

For a summary of Shleifer’s and Vishny’s work, see John E. Core, et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A
Survey, 9 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 27, 28 (2003).
11
Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (P. Newman, ed.
1998).
12
Calculation based on EXECUCOMP database; see Erin White and Kris Maher, Companies Tighten the Pinch For WhiteCollar Compensation, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.careerjournal.com/salaryhiring/negotiate/20041102-white.html (an average of 5-6% per year, with a 7% increase
from 2002 to 2003, to a total of $2.12 million).
13
See, e.g., Employee Abuse Prevention Act, S. 2798, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002).
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corporate America. CEO’s have too much power and it has been directed at their own
enrichment.”14
The source of this “enrichment” is the use of equity as a form of compensation, which
has grown as a percentage of total compensation from about 25 to 50 percent over the past ten
years. To some scholars, this is a good news story, since prior to the advent of equity
compensation, risk-averse CEOs with non-diversifiable human capital were paid like
bureaucrats, and thus had incentives to build empires (because pay was linked to size), to shirk
(because pay was not linked to performance), and to choose less risky projects than shareholders
would prefer (because of misaligned risk profiles), all at the expense of maximizing shareholder
value. A result of this trend “has been to increase CEO pay-to-performance sensitivities by a
factor of more than ten times from 1980 to 1999”.15
Others, however, lament the specific application of the theory to practice, noting that
CEOs with large option packages are being compensated for luck or are able to enrich
themselves because the board or Wall Street did not fulfill its monitoring duties or did not
understand the full cost or true nature of the option packages. A common objection is that stock
options are poorly designed and are over-awarded because directors do not understand their true
economic or accounting costs.16 One recent survey of corporate governance summarized the view
this way: “It is widely recognized . . . that these options are at best an inefficient financial
incentive and at worst create new incentive or conflict-of-interest problems of their own.”17
While this debate rages on, one unquestioned result of the increase in equity-based pay is the
huge increase in the size of CEO pay, and therefore the importance of a legitimate compensation
contracting process.
A. Compensation theory: “optimal contracting” versus “managerial power”
In theory, firms enter into employment contracts with senior managers to minimize
agency costs. Whether negotiation actually takes place or is governed exogenously by the labor
and other markets, we can say that an efficient employment contract is one that maximizes the
net economic value to shareholders less transaction costs and payments to managers. The
efficiency of any individual employment contract or group of contracts is difficult to measure,
however, so judgments about the efficiency of executive compensation are based on theoretical
models of the employment contracting process. The debate thus revolves around which of the
models better describes reality.
1. Optimal contracting
One model—called “optimal contracting”—contends that compensation packages of
CEOs are specifically designed to reduce agency costs. In this model, common contractual terms,
14

Gretchen Morgenson, Option Pie: Overeating is a Health Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at § 3, 1.

15

Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong? 10 (ECGI
Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=441100.
16
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 45.
17
Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE (Constantinides, Harris,
and Stulz, eds. 2002).
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like option grants, corporate loans, and severance agreements, are best explained by owners’
attempts to overcome the tendency of managers to be risk averse, to shirk, and to prefer a
diversified investment portfolio. Individual contracts may deviate from the optimal level because
transaction costs limit the ability of firms to continuously recontract with managers over their
compensation,18 but “on average [and over time] the system is efficient within transaction
costs.”19 This is because a variety of market forces—markets for labor, capital, products, and
corporate control—restrain managers from earning excessive salaries. In other words, optimal
contracting predicts that executive compensation packages are generally those one would expect
from arm’s-length bargaining for labor between the manager and the firm.20
2. Managerial power
In contrast, the “managerial power” school contends that compensation agreements
systematically deviate from efficient results because of the ability of managers to manipulate the
decision making process to serve their own, self-interested ends. Compensation contracts we
observe are not attempts to reduce agency costs, they are evidence of agency costs. Managers are
able to extract rents because directors, who are firmly under management control, set their pay,
and because shareholders are diffuse and disinterested in corporate governance, generally
preferring liquidity to control. A brief outline of the pay setting process is needed to set the stage.
State corporate statutes vest the power to set the compensation of managers in the board
of directors.21 As a practical matter, however, compensation is set by the compensation
committee with the input of a consultant, who prepares reports on CEO pay in general and in the
specific industry in question, and makes recommendations on levels and types of compensation.
The full board may tweak the edges, but in most cases the recommendation of the compensation
committee is adopted without shareholder input or vote. Outside of Chapter 11 there are few
legal restraints on levels of executive compensation, and those there are have little bite. For
example, courts occasionally review the process of setting or substance of compensation
agreements, but rarely if ever are agreements set aside. The IRS is also empowered to review
compensation levels for reasonableness and compliance with “performance-based” requirements,
but there are no cases in which they have done so.22
The managerial power view asserts that executive compensation contracts set through
this process are decidedly not negotiated at arm’s-length. The specific factors limiting the ability
of firms to do so are: (1) the power of the CEO over the appointment of directors; (2) the ability
of the CEO to reward cooperative directors; (3) the social and psychological influences the CEO
has over directors, such as the power of friendship, loyalty, collegiality, and authority; (4) the
18

Recontracting costs include the following: (1) the fact that CEO contracts are routinely 3 to 5 years in length and include
severe early termination penalties, (2) the social and psychological barriers that arise because of the close working relationship
between the board and the CEO, (3) the complexity of typical compensation contracts, (4) the opportunity cost of management
and board time, and (5) the lack of compensation saliency in any given year.
19
Core et al., supra note 9.
20
See Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1872
(1992).
21
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5), (15) (2006).
22
See Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation, __ ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 85 (1998).
This may be changing. See Joann S. Lublin, IRS Is Cracking Down on Abuse Of Executive-Bonus Tax Breaks, WALL ST. J., June
18, 2004, at B5.
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cognitive biases of directors that come from being CEOs or former CEOs themselves; (5) and the
time and informational barriers most directors face to making an informed and reasoned decision
about pay.23 The net result, writes one critic who has seen the process from the inside, is that “the
negotiations between a CEO and the outside directors who sit on the compensation committee
can hardly be called negotiations at all.”24
After claiming to debunk the actual negotiations claim, the managerial power model then
attacks the claim that market forces constrain managerial appetites and that agreements represent
the terms the parties would have reached had they bargained. Market forces are ineffective
because managers “camouflage” the true nature and extent of their compensation,25 and because
the stakes while large for individual managers, are insufficient to have any significant effect on
the firm’s cost of capital or to justify a takeover to oust the greediest managers.26 So on one side
of the “negotiations” we have the CEO who controls the compensation setting process and has
very strong incentives to put lots of time and energy into designing a compensation scheme that
will be both self-serving and obscure, and on the other we have directors who, despite being the
representatives of the shareholders, owe their jobs to the CEO and basically serve at his pleasure,
and therefore have every reason to acquiesce, since the risk (both personal and professional)
from offending the CEO dwarfs any potential threat from a shareholder derivative suit.
In addition to criticizing the amount CEOs are currently paid, critics point to several
specific types of compensation as particularly objectionable on efficiency or fairness grounds.
For example, Bebchuk and Fried argue that restricted stock and traditional options (with an atthe-money strike price) are suboptimal from an efficiency perspective. The argument is that
traditional (non-indexed, at-the-money) options do not provide as much incentive bang for the
buck as indexed options with a strike price above the current market price. For example, if an oil
firm grants the CEO 100,000 non-indexed, at-the-money options on January 1, and on July 1 the
price of oil increases (because of, say, a crisis in the Middle East) causing the firm’s stock price
to rise $10 per share, the CEO will earn $1 million largely for events outside of his control. In
addition, because the shares of all oil firms will rise, shareholders in this firm get nothing from
this payment that they could not have received from holding a diversified basket of oil firm
securities. It would be more efficient, so the argument goes, to set the strike price above the
market price (to give the executive an incentive to increase share value above a certain threshold
level) and to link compensation to firm-specific performance by comparing the firm’s
performance with an index of other firms in that industry. Because this compensation design is
rather straightforward and yet firms do not do it, it is believed that the “design of option
programs is consistent with the presence of managerial power.”27 Instead, managerial power
theorists suggest the use of improved equity compensation, such as indexed options or
performance-based vesting.28
23

BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 25-53.

24

Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1873 (1992)
(reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)).
25
See Bebchuk, Managerial Power, supra note 3 at 785-7.
26
See id at 777-78.
27
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 45.
28
Id. Numerous academic studies have, for many years, supported the use of indexed stock options. See, e.g., Shane A. Johnson
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B. Reform proposals – institutional investors and powerful boards as saviors
There are two favorite reform proposals designed to reduce managerial power, and thus
change executive compensation: either boards or institutional investors playing a more active
role in monitoring and disciplining management.
1. Theoretical studies and proposals
The argument that institutional investors should take an active and systematic role in
monitoring executive compensation levels in healthy firms is contrary to the prevailing wisdom
that shareholders generally prefer liquidity to control.29 Managerial power theorists, however,
claim that creating larger blockholders can create the right mix of incentives and costs to permit
greater market discipline of managers.30 The typical theoretical model assumes that larger
investors have lower informational gathering costs, lower costs of action (e.g., mobilizing the
proxy machinery), greater signaling credibility, and higher liquidity costs (i.e., more willingness
to monitor because of the costs and risks of trading).31 Practice deviates from theory, however,
since these investors are hamstrung by various laws, regulations, and habits that limit their role
in firm oversight. This fact leads some observers to suggest reforms that would allow
institutional investors to join forces to have more influence and provide greater monitoring of
firms.32
Some reform proposals are merely calls for institutional investors to assume a more
powerful role in firm governance. Randall Thomas argues that institutional investors with large
ownership stakes “should demand that directors justify executive pay packages as value
maximizing for the firm,” since owners are the best group to “insist on an accounting” of these
costs.33 This is echoed by commentators and firm stakeholders (such as labor unions), the actions
of several large pension funds, such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF, and studies alleging a link
between the share of equity owned by institutional investors and corporate governance or firm
performance.34
A more interventionist set of proposals argues for various structural reforms to facilitate
institutional investor monitoring. George Dent argues that the “mistreatment of shareholders,”
& Yisong S. Tian, Indexed Executive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (2000) (designing option that supposedly filters out
market risk, and thus increases the firm-specific incentive power of the option.).
29
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277,
1287-88 (1991).
30
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 461-88.
31
See, for example, Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention, 53 J.
FIN. 99, 100-02(1998).
32
Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992).
33
Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 437, 467 (2003).
34
See Shivram Rajgopal & Mohan Venkatachalam, The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: An Empirical
Investigation (Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1436, 1997), available at
https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1436.pdf (institutional investor ownership correlated with better
monitoring); Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia? (Oct. 30, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=47271) (firms with greater institutional ownership invest more
in R&D); see Willard T. Carleton et al., The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations:
Evidence from TIAA-CREFI, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1335 (1998).
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can be remedied by creating shareholder committees to control the firm’s proxy process for
electing directors.35 Dent’s solution is to have the firm’s largest “ten to twenty” shareholders
serve on a committee that would, among other things, nominate directors for election. He argues
that these shareholder committees would constrain executive compensation because shareholders
on these committees would gain expertise about management issues; would be able to nominate
directors to represent them; would get access to better corporate information; and would be
motivated to spend money on monitoring because of their large holdings. (We will see that this
proposal is fairly approximated by the use of creditors’ committees in Chapter 11, and therefore
the compensation practices in bankrupt firms is a test of this proposal.)
Empowering boards is another proposed solution. Legions of academics believe that
effective boards could provide a check on managerial rent seeking.36 Effectiveness could be
achieved in several ways. Board members could be required to take a bigger equity stake in the
firm, making them in effect super-empowered shareholders – they would have the pocket-book
incentives to act in the interests of shareholders while having the information, access, and voting
power of management.37 Another option would be to create more independence between board
and the CEO, so that board members could exercise their own judgment about an executive’s
worth and engage in true arm’s-length bargaining.38 (Again, Chapter 11 is a case in which the
decision makers—boards, DIP lenders, creditors’ committees, and vulture investors—are
empowered and highly motivated by their own economic incentives.)
2. Empirical studies
Recent empirical research claims to support these proposals. One study finds that
“institutional investors are a monitoring device that provides a direct influence on the structure of
executive compensation.”39 Another recent study finds that firms with reduced agency costs
(large shareholders, low CEO tenure, small board sizes, majority independent boards) are less
likely to reward CEOs for luck.40 This study proceeds on the assumption that “separation [of
ownership and control] allows CEOs to gain effective control of the pay-setting process,” and
thus allows CEOs to use “entrenchment”—packing the board with friends and allies—and “the

35

George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 883 (1989).

36

See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 13; LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND
ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 209-18 (1988) (proposing that 25 percent of directors should be elected by shareholders without
any management role/interference); MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 117-20 (1966) (permitting
shareholders holding more than 5 percent of a firm’s stock to nominate directors in the proxy materials).
37
See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 652-53 (1995); see
also Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems,
and How to Fix Them (ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305.
38
See, e.g., Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 912-13 (1996); see also Arthur Levitt, Jr., Money, Money, Money, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at A14
(“[E]xcessive compensation . . . packages are a consequence of boards falling victim to a seduction by the CEO.”).
39
Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation 16 (Sept. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract_id=236592); see Parthiban David et al., The Effect of Institutional Investors on
the Level and Mix of CEO Compensation, 41 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 200, 202-06 (1998).
40
See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116
QUART. J. ECON. 901 (2001).
THE
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complexity of the pay process” to “set their own pay with little oversight from shareholders.”41
The authors call CEO rent seeking “skimming,” and they find less of it in “[w]ell-governed
firms, such as those with a large shareholder present on the board.”42 As a shortcut, the authors
describe the presence of a large shareholder as “having a principal around,” which they view as
causing firms to link pay more closely with performance. (Chapter 11 is the prototypical case of
“having a principal around”.)
The empirical data is far from conclusive, however, as many studies find no correlation
between corporate governance changes and executive compensation. For example, an empirical
study of compensation practices in about 200 firms from 1993 to 1997 shows no evidence of a
change in compensation practices despite increasing shareholder activism.43 Another similar
empirical study shows no link between criticized compensation practices (for example, resetting
option exercise prices lower when stock prices fall and options are “out of the money”) and poor
corporate governance.44 In fact, one study finds that the number of non-management directors on
a board is correlated with higher levels of executive compensation, perhaps because these
directors lack information and expertise to capably police management in compensation
decisions.45 While the weight of the recent literature can fairly be said to adhere to the theory of
managerial power, as one survey recently concluded, the “data is largely inconclusive.”46
III. THE POWER OF CAPITAL PROVIDERS IN CHAPTER 11

In Chapter 11, creditors ranging from banks to specialty investors in distressed firms,
known as “vulture investors,” get this power through a mix of contract and statutory rights, the
former coming from detailed and extensive covenants provided in new or restructured debt
contracts, and the latter from the Bankruptcy Code. The rights of creditors include: access to
corporate information, pre-approval rights for certain investment decisions, participation in key
personnel decisions, and other actions that look more like day-to-day decisions (which are
normally the exclusive province of management) than fundamental corporate decisions (where
creditors usually have some say). The net effect, as we shall see in section IV below, is that the
fears about managerial power distorting the compensation bargaining process are largely
alleviated or mitigated for firms in financial distress.

41
42

Id. at 902-03.
Id. at 903, 921.

43

Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive Compensation 16, 37 (May 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract_id=41780) (finding that pay packages are sensitive to negative media reports
and specific lobbying by pension funds (i.e., CALPERS), but not shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8).
44
See Mary Ellen Carter & Luann J. Lynch, An Examination of Executive Stock Option Repricing, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2001);
see also Ronald C. Anderson & John M. Bizjak, An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation
Committee in Structuring Executive Pay (Apr. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=220851
Kam-Ming Wan, Independent Directors, Executive Pay, and Firm Performance, EFMA 2003 Helsinki Meetings (June 27, 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=392595.
45
John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON.
371, 385-88 (1999).
46
Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Hypotheses of
Executive Compensation 5 (Aug. 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=574861).
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A. Monitoring and discipline outside Chapter 11
Outside of the Chapter 11 context, investors (large and small) generally do not monitor
management closely, preferring liquidity to control.47 Building on Albert Hirschman’s famous
generalization about the choice of “exit” or “voice,” John Coffee described the liquidity of U.S.
financial markets as providing an “‘exit’ option [that] weakens institutional voice.”48 As Coffee
observes, institutional investors are watchdogs “whose every incentive is to flee at the first sign
of trouble.”49 For the vast majority of firms and investors, this is a perfectly sensible strategy
because the “costs” of monitoring and disciplining management for potentially value-destroying
actions are higher than the expected benefits from such action. This may be in part because the
costs are real, dollar costs, while the benefits may be hard to quantify and more illusory. There
are several significant “costs” of monitoring that are worth considering before we consider
whether they are present or absent in the Chapter 11 context.
1. Costs of monitoring
First, the characteristics of the modern firm – control vested in risk averse, opportunistic
managers, and ownership held in small shares by diffuse shareholders – creates not only the
classic agency problem but also a collective action/free rider problem that inhibits shareholder
action to limit agency costs. The free rider problem arises because shareholders are by and large
dispersed and hold relatively small stakes, and therefore each is unwilling to incur monitoring
costs since the benefits will inure to all shareholders without regard to who spent the time or
money to monitor.50 The presence of a large shareholder (say a mutual fund with a 10 percent
stake) does not solve this problem completely. While this investor may be able to monitor and
discipline managers more effectively (because of experience and economies of scale), it will
receive only 10 percent of the expected value of the investment in monitoring and discipline.
While one can imagine a scenario in which such an investment might make economic sense, the
investors is nevertheless unlikely to make such an investment.51 This is because the relevant
metric is not the absolute expected value of the investment, but the cost and return of the next
best alternative. The investor can simply and cheaply move its funds to an infinite number of
other investments that do not require a speculative investment in monitoring, and yet offer a
similar mix of risk and return. In addition, professional investors compete for investment dollars
largely on the basis of return net of management fees, and the monitoring expenditures will
necessarily lower their performance. Other investment firms can free ride on this investment,
therefore earning the 10 percent expected return without any of the monitoring costs, resulting in
a more attractive return net of costs. In effect, the monitor would be subsidizing its competitors.
Accordingly, ignoring the potential ancillary benefits described below, only a 100 percent owner
would rationally invest in expensive management monitoring.52
47
48
49
50

Coffee, supra note 29, at 1281.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1329.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 653-54 (1984).
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For example, a $1 million investment in monitoring with a 50 percent probably of yielding $22 million in shareholder value
has a positive expected value of $1.1 million.
52
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 395, 402 (1983).
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Second, even if the free-rider problem can be overcome, say by shareholders pooling
their shares or collaborating through contract, effective monitoring is expensive and difficult to
execute. A primary barrier is the information asymmetries that exist between managers and
investors. The only information available to investors comes through official, regulated
disclosures and public statements, neither of which is conducive to effective monitoring.53 As
long as managers control the timing and content of information dissemination, investors will be
at a disadvantage, especially when it comes to attempts to control covert cheating, such as
shirking or camouflaged compensation. Moreover, monitoring day-to-day activities of the firm is
impractical and unwise, as it defeats the purpose of having agents in the first place, and simply
moves the locus of decision making authority to the monitors. It is also fraught with potential
risks, such as insider trading liability or limitations on trading (e.g., the short-swing trading rules
of §16(b)) that come with access to “inside information.”
A third limit on monitoring is managers have little reason to heed to the requests of
shareholders acting alone given their relatively small stakes.54 This can be theoretically overcome
through explicit or implicit confederation among shareholders, especially after the SEC removed
barriers to inter-shareholder communications,55 but it rarely happens in practice because the costs
(of collecting information, of monitoring, of communicating with other shareholders, of reaching
an agreement on how to proceed and about what, of resolving any conflicts of interest among
shareholders, and of following through with management) exceed the likely benefits or costbenefit tradeoff of the next best alternative, which is to simply sell the shares.
Fourth, there are inevitable conflicts of interest and fears of retaliation that may limit
investor voice. Many institutional investors have other related divisions that do business with the
firms they invest in. An activist role in monitoring the firm and disciplining top management
might undermine these ancillary business opportunities in ways that erase any gains from
activism. This may be true not only for cases in which there is an existing business relationship
that raises a potential conflict, but also in cases where the institutional investor is trying to win
future business with the firm or more generally by damaging the reputation of the investor as
someone that is “anti-management.”
A fifth limitation is the heterogeneity of investors’ incentives and potential conflicts of
interest. In other words, not all 10 percent blockholders (such as there are) are created equal. An
insurance firm can be expected to act quite differently than a mutual fund or pension fund with
the exact same ownership stake. While we might expect the insurance firm to be quite
conservative in its investments of this size, and therefore invest in monitoring in some way
(perhaps through contractual means with other shareholders), a mutual fund will likely prefer
liquidity given the fact that fund managers compete on costs. In contrast, a pension fund’s
decisions will be perhaps influenced by political or public policy considerations favored by its
union members or political constituents in legislature. Proponents of an increased
53

Managerial power scholars note that even board members, who are required by law to be familiar with the financial and
strategic state of the firm, are at an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis management. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 2553.
54
Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 545 (2000).
55
See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-2 (2006).
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monitoring/disciplining role for institutional investors recognize this constraint on the
effectiveness of this solution, but nevertheless argue that some form of “institutional voice” can
be a positive contributor to the socially efficient governance of a firm.56 The prerequisite to
creating an effective “institutional voice,” according to Black, is creating a forum (either explicit
or implicit) in which “different types of institutions . . . join forces to exercise influence,” in a
way in which they “can monitor each others’ actions,” and rely to some extent on reputational
penalties to align interests. This is no small task, what Black calls a “complicating factor” to his
proposal to empower institutional investors to monitor/discipline managers.57
Finally, in stark contrast to the costs of trying to exert control, the depth of U.S. capital
markets make the cost of liquidity low, thus raising the relative cost of monitoring. Capital
providers in solvent firms may be less interested in monitoring because they can shift their
investments among competing management teams with relatively low transaction costs.58 In
addition, investments in monitoring may decrease an investor’s exit options, thus decreasing the
liquidity of the investment, and therefore having the perverse effect of increasing management’s
incentive to shirk or rent seek. If the investor raises the costs of its exit – in effect choosing
“voice” over “exit” – that provides management with an assurance that the investor will not sell
its shares at levels it otherwise would have. The more the investor sinks into monitoring
management, the less likely (up to a point) the investor will be to sell its shares.
2. Benefits of monitoring
There are a few potential benefits an investor might receive from adopting a monitoring
strategy. The most obvious is an increase in the value of a specific investment because the
monitoring resulted in increased shareholder value. As discussed above, this strategy makes the
most sense for an owner with a substantial stake. But even in that case, it is unlikely because
there is little or no evidence that a specific investment in improving firm governance is a net
present value positive investment. In fact, several studies suggest that there is no correlation at
all between improved governance and shareholder value.59 Without clear evidence (empirical or
otherwise) supporting such an investment, it is very unlikely to occur on solely this basis given
the fact that the monitoring costs will be real and quite large.
Monitoring is likely an unprofitable investment strategy for two reasons. First, once an
investor adopts this strategy, its competitors will know that they can free ride on the investor’s
monitoring expenditures. In other words, once Fidelity signals that it is monitoring a specific
firm or firms in general, why would Janus spend any money to monitor when it can follow
Fidelity’s investment choices and free ride on its monitoring expenditures? Because investors
compete for funds in a highly competitive market, the net effect will be similar returns across
competitors, with the monitoring investor having higher management fees. Investor cash will
flow to the non-monitoring investors, who share in the benefits with none of the costs.
56
57
58

Bernard S. Black, supra note 32, at 815-18.
Id.
See, for example, Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 291 (1980).
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See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP.
L. 349, 367 (2000).
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Second, because any corporate governance improvements—say splitting the Chair and
CEO role, or indexing the CEO’s options—are transparent to and easily replicated by other
firms, any competitive advantages for firms adopting these strategies are unsustainable, and
therefore unlikely to move market prices enough to justify any ex ante investment. This is
especially true since any benefits from changes in corporate governance are more likely to be
revealed only in the long term, when any first-mover advantage will be dissipated as other firms
adopt similar reforms. Although in this way overall societal wealth may be increased, no
individual investor will care, since they compete against other investors for investment dollars,
and are unconcerned with total societal welfare.
There are also several potential benefits that are unrelated to the return from a specific
investment in a given firm, but these are also likely to be small or attractive to only certain types
of investors. For example, adopting a monitoring strategy may improve the investment firm’s
reputation among a certain class of investors, thereby increasing the influx of capital to the firm.
This is akin to a sort of branding, whereby the firm distinguishes itself as an “active investor.”
As noted above, the market for investment capital is extremely competitive, and if most investors
base their decisions on performance data, as one would expect, this branding strategy is unlikely
to be successful over the long run unless the investments in monitoring lead to improved
performance. Another potential reason for investing in monitoring is the political benefits that
some public pension firms derive from investor activism. This is necessarily limited to a few
investors, and is unlikely to translate into a broader activism movement.
B. Monitoring in Chapter 11
The cost-benefit analysis of monitoring changes in Chapter 11. When firms are in
financial distress, the monitoring costs for owners decrease significantly, allowing, or in some
cases effectively requiring, greater participation in the management of the firm.
The primary effect of bankruptcy is (in almost all cases) to wipe out the claims of the
distant, diffuse, and disinterested shareholders, and to leave only sophisticated investors, such as
banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and bond investors. The investors left standing when
the music stops for a firm are specialist, repeat players in workouts or distressed investing.
These investors achieve control either through buying significant blocks of a firm’s outstanding
debt or by agreeing to loan the debtor additional funds, subject to restrictive debt covenants that
grant the lender contractual control of many of the firm’s activities. In most cases, the holders of
bank debt consolidate their interests in and around financial distress by creating a single credit
facility that reorders the existing debt of many providers and pumps new cash into the debtor. A
similar consolidation happens with the bond debt, as vulture investors buy up large stakes of the
bond debt in order to get a blocking position in the reorganization process.60
60

A creditor holding more than 33 percent of the claims in a class has a blocking position and can effectively hold up approval
of any plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006). Because creditors very rarely hold such large stakes in firms, without some way
for creditors to buy claims from other creditors, no single creditor can achieve this leverage position vis-à-vis management. Prior
to 1990, the market for distressed debt and claims was severely limited because courts scrutinized attempted transfers of
ownership stakes to the point that it impeded the development of a market for these claims. This changed in 1991 when the
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure amended Rule 3001(e)(2) to allow claims to be traded without the
court’s approval. As one observer notes, “[b]efore [1990], there was no secondary market for distressed bank debt, . . . [b]ut, by
the late 1990s, an investor could buy defaulted loans through practically any bank or brokerage firm.” HILARY ROSENBERG, THE
VULTURE INVESTORS 19 (2000). This market allows turnaround specialists to play an active role in the outcome of Chapter 11
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These bank and vulture investors take an active role in the governance of the distressed or
bankrupt firm because the costs of monitoring/discipline decrease and the benefits increase. The
vulture investors, for example, are “frequently active on boards and in management of the target
companies,” gaining “sufficient power in these companies to discipline management.”61 The
same is true for banks and other institutional creditors, who, through the use of a revolving credit
facility with restrictive covenants, “essentially control[] the corporation.”62 The costs of
monitoring for investors decreases because of the powers granted to investors by statute,
regulation, and contract, as well as through more robust judicial oversight by the bankruptcy
court. The reduction in monitoring costs and the increasing benefits are evident by looking at
how creditors behave when monitoring firms reorganizing under Chapter 11.
1. Consolidating ownership interests reduces monitoring costs
The primary source of reduced monitoring costs is the consolidation of creditors’
ownership interests when firms file for reorganization. This consolidation reduces, or even
solves, several of the problems identified above, including the free-rider problem, the
informational asymmetries, and the weak institutional voice caused by inter-owner coordination
costs. Consolidation is achieved in two primary ways: the consolidation of bank debt into a
single credit facility, and the use of creditors’ committees to provide a lower-cost forum for other
claimants to exercise voice.
a. Consolidating bank debt
Healthy firms typically have many capital providers, from millions of individuals to
large, institutional lenders of many flavors, including many mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance
companies, banks, and so on. The only significant outside constraints on management behavior,
aside from labor, capital, and product markets, are the fiduciary duties running to shareholders
and the covenants contained in various indenture contracts with banks. Chapter 11 has two
effects. First, it generally wipes out the interests of equity holders, therefore shifting
management’s fiduciary duties from shareholders to debt holders.63 The second effect is a
consolidation of the bank debt. The debt of healthy firms is usually held by numerous banks and
other institutional debt holders, none of which has a dominant share of the firm’s debt. When a
firm becomes severely financially distressed, however, these many creditors routinely “morph
into a single revolving credit facility.”64 One large bank or consortium of banks agrees to provide
cash influx and to restructure existing obligations subject to new contractual terms that grant the
bank an increased role in the governance of the debtor. When firms face financial distress, the
reorganizations by permitting debt to flow to those most willing to use it to create a blocking position and exert influence over
management. According to a partner at a leading distressed debt investment/turnaround shop, “I can’t think of a big-time deal in
the past ten years that didn’t involve substantial participation, if not total control, by major vultures and banks.” Id.
61
Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN.
ECON. 401 (1997).
62
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 1226.
63
See Richard M. Cieri & Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and Officers of Corporations that are Insolvent or in the Zone
or Vicinity of Insolvency: Important Considerations, Practical Solutions, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COMMERCIAL L. J. 295, 300 (2004);
see also Unsecured Creditors Comm. of STN Enter., Inc. v. Noyes, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985).
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17

DRAFT – 8/28/06

need for a cash influx puts the debtor in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis creditors willing to
extend new financing. Lenders of post-petition funds “use the terms of [the] loans to shape the
Chapter 11 case,” effectively “constrain[ing] the debtor’s managers’ wiggle room.”65
These new credit facilities give creditors access to better information than shareholders
usually receive, putting them in a much better position to monitor management activities.66 The
loan agreements also are typically replete with specific contractual restrictions on the activities
of the debtor. Standard terms include the right of the creditor to closely monitor firm cash flows
– which also equalizes any informational asymmetries67 – to have veto rights over major
investments, and to insist on a change in management personnel or incentives, including hiring a
turnaround specialist, known as a Chief Restructuring Officer. In addition, the unification of
ownership in a single agreement allows creditors to enforce these contractual terms more easily
and in a less costly manner. The overall effect is to give the creditor(s) behind the revolving
credit facility “practical control” over the debtor and to “ensure that no major decision is made in
a way that [the creditors] find[] objectionable.”68 As Baird and Rassmussen described a recent
reorganization, “[o]nce the revolving credit facility was in place, control rights had shifted . . .
[and] [f]rom that point forward, the banks that ran the revolving credit facility essentially
controlled the corporation.”69 The firm’s capital providers, once relegated to the choice of
accepting management actions or selling their shares, now have the powers “normally reserved
for directors,” such as “whether to sell a division, change the business plan or replace the
managers.”70
b. Consolidating unsecured debt – the creditors’ committee
Creditors can also greatly reduce their monitoring costs by forming a committee(s) to
represent their interests during the reorganization.71 These “creditors’ committees” are formed
under § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code, with the holders of “the seven largest claims against the
debtor” for the type of claim represented by a specific committee, representing the entire class of
such claims.72 These committees are a decision-making forum for the creditors with the largest
financial incentives and the most resources to devote to monitoring. This system largely
overcomes the collective action and free-rider problem that keeps small, diffuse shareholders
from being effective monitors.73 The committee structure does this by lowering the costs of
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David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003).
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 1226-27.
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68
Id. at 1241.
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Id. at 1227; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 60, at 24.
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collective decision making with clear legal rules.74 Committees also create a single investor
voice, with weight, that the debtor simply cannot ignore. After all, the creditors’ committee is the
mechanism through which the debtor’s reorganization plan must be approved, and the committee
is also entitled to petition the bankruptcy court for redress if management refuses to listen to its
demands.
Creditors’ committees also reduce inter-creditor communication costs. Committees
operate within a richly developed legal context of statute, case law, and custom that establish a
framework in which communications costs are lower, and decisions can be made more quickly
and efficiently.75 Creditors on the committee are represented by counsel experienced in debt
restructurings and can freely communicate and work together to serve the interests of their class
of creditors. Committees hold frequent meetings, engage in strategic and business planning
parallel to management, and routinely communicate with both the debtor and the court
overseeing the reorganization. The committee structure therefore has the advantage of providing
straightforward decision making rules for settling inter-creditor disputes, thus reducing creditor
transaction costs tremendously.
The committee structure not only benefits creditors who serve on the committee, but it
also provides a centralized forum that reduces communication costs for creditors who are not on
the committee. Many sophisticated investors choose not to serve on creditors’ committees
because access brings with it inside information, and may thus be offset by a concomitant
obligation to refrain from trading securities of the debtor.76 Because of the fear of potential
liability for insider trading, many investors find other, indirect ways to be influential.77 One
investor, James Rubin from Sass, Lamle, Rubin & Company, describes his ability to operate
outside the committee structure by using subtle pressure and the power of suggestion to influence
those on the committee or within the firm – “The longer I’ve been involved in this business the
less necessary it’s been for me to serve on committees to be influential.”78
Committees also allow creditors to overcome the informational asymmetries that owners
usually have with managers. Committees have statutory powers to collect and process
information relevant to running the firm, all at the expense of the debtor. For example, § 1103(c)
grants creditors broad powers to form committees to pool their power together, including the
right to (1) consult with debtor in possession, (2) investigate “the acts, conducts, assets,
74
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(citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 132-35 (1971)) (“a
group can surmount a collective action problem if pre-existing organizational structures can be converted to provide the
collective good at a sufficiently low cost or the collective good can be provided as a by-product of an organization based on
other, often private incentives.”).
75
For example, the Code requires that the first meeting of creditors (the “section 341 meeting”) be held 20-40 days after the
petition is filed; be run by the United States Trustee; and is attended by the debtor, who is questioned under oath about the case.
76
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liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business,” (3)
participate in formulation of a reorganization plan, and (4) “perform such other services as are in
the interest of those represented.” Creditors, through their committees, also have the statutory
power to appoint legal, financial, and strategic advisors, all of which will be paid from the assets
of the debtor.79 Creditors are often consulted at every stage by the debtor before key decisions are
made. As stated in the reorganization plan of Silicon Graphics: “The Debtors have informed the
Creditors’ Committee with respect to their operations and have sought concurrence of [it] for
actions . . . outside of the ordinary course of business.”80
In practice, sophisticated investors in modern reorganization cases typically do their own
strategic and financial assessments of the debtor, as well as assess investment opportunities,
create business plans, perform valuation and liquidation analyses, and so on. In short, creditors,
be they vulture investors, banks, or insurance companies, set up a parallel management team – at
little or no cost – that allows them to ensure management decisions are appropriate to maximize
value for owners.
2. The impact of financial distress on other monitoring costs
The other monitoring costs identified above are also substantially mitigated in firms
reorganizing their balance sheets under Chapter 11 or privately with creditors. Let us look at
each briefly in turn.
First, there are the possible conflicts of interest that arise when an institutional investor is
not only an investor in a firm but also has or would like to have other business relations with that
firm. While this may limit investor activism outside the Chapter 11 context, it is much less likely
to limit monitoring by distressed debt investors or creditors that provide DIP loans. Vulture
investors are typically unaffiliated with a large investment house, and are not routinely engaged
in other types of business activities, such as commercial lending, consulting, or accounting.81
These investment shops tend to be small, leanly staffed, and super specialized on distressed
investing. They are interested solely in profiting from an increase in the price of the bonds they
purchased at cents on the dollar, or on turning around the debtor and profiting from the rise in
equity value post emergence. “We are not interested in making friends with management so we
can sell them advice or deals later on,” said a partner at a New York vulture fund. “We are repeat
players, but not with them. At least we and they hope not.”82
The large banks and other creditors that participate in establishing a new or restructured
revolving credit facility are also unlikely to be deterred by conflicts of interest, but for different
reasons. These creditors do have other business prospects that might be hurt by an aggressive,
anti-management reputation, but any reputational hit is likely to be offset by the reputational
79
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benefit the investor will get as a result of it willingness to provide additional capital to the firm in
its time of dire need. A distressed debt specialist at a large, commercial bank put it this way: “We
are heroes to these guys for extending them a life line. I don’t think they begrudge our increased
presence, they recognize that our heroism has a price.”83
Another impediment to monitoring that is reduced in Chapter 11 is the ability of investors
in healthy firms to use market liquidity to exit the firm quickly and at a low cost. While the
market for the debt and trade claims of distressed firms is growing, it remains small compared
with traditional debt and equity markets, and is inhabited largely by firms that specialize in this
type of investing. In addition, these investors often obtain inside information as a necessary
element of their turnaround efforts, and this limits their ability to exit without having to disgorge
their profits or face other legal sanctions. Until very recently, creditors serving on the creditors’
committee were unable to trade bonds in the secondary market because such trading would likely
be construed as insider trading or, at the very least, a conflict with the duties owed by the
committee member to the estate of the debtor.84
Finally, Chapter 11 largely solves another element of the collection action problem for
investors – the heterogeneity of interests across investors constraining an agreement about the
proper size and scope of monitoring activities. The use of a unitary revolving credit facility or
the domination of a creditors’ committee by a vulture investor solves the heterogeneity problem,
more or less, and is as close as we can come to aligning perfectly the interests of ownership and
control short of the owner-operated firm.
***
The end result of lower costs of monitoring and increased incentive to monitor is that the
managers of a financially distressed company are subject to oversight by creditors, bankruptcy
trustees, shareholders, and even courts in ways that healthy companies are not. As one observer
recently observed: “The mere presence of flocks of vultures in the market has fundamentally
changed the dynamics of bankruptcy from a situation in which management has an
overwhelming advantage to one in which these new creditors have great sway.”85 Chapter 11
thus represents a situation in which ownership and control is partially or even mostly reunited.86
The “owners” of the firm are effectively in control of the management, at least with respect to
the major decisions facing the firm. “Creditors have increasingly exercised de facto control” over
firms reorganizing in Chapter 11.87
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IV. BARGAINING FOR COMPENSATION IN THE SHADOW OF CHAPTER 11

Turning the focus to executive compensation, the predominant theory is that “the
principal beneficiaries of Chapter 11 . . . are corporate managers” who are able to “expropriate
for themselves the wealth of [the firm’s capital providers].”88 This is difficult to square with the
monitoring story just described. If the rent-seeking theory is true – that is, managers entrench and
enrich themselves in excess of their worth to the firm – they would have to do so under the
watchful eye of sophisticated investors who specialize in turning around distressed firms, who
voluntarily agreed to take a financial stake in the outcome of the firm, and who, through a variety
of statutory and contractual rights, have a dominant say in how the firm is managed. This
highlights a tension between Chapter 11’s preference for debtor-controlled reorganization and
the role of vulture/DIP lender monitoring for reorganizing firms. Nowhere will this tension be
more prevalent than in the issues about what individuals should manage the firm and how they
will be incentivized.
A. Bargaining Dynamics
The traditional view of executive compensation in bankruptcy is that managers are as
powerful (or even more so) than they are in healthy firms, allowing them to enrich themselves at
the expense of shareholders and creditors. A recent news report expresses the common outrage:
“When failing companies ask employees to take huge pay cuts, when they’re laying off
thousands of wage-earners, when they’re slashing pension benefits, it’s astonishing that the top
executives of those companies are still enjoying stratospheric compensation packages.”89
Many academic accounts of bankruptcy theory share this belief that managers are in a
privileged position and are able to profit excessively from failing firms. According to these
accounts, the current Bankruptcy Code’s preference for management operation of the debtor
allows managers to extract rents in the form of higher salaries, big option grants, and lavish
retention and emergence bonuses.90 The bankruptcy reform passed by Congress in 2005 codifies
this view, to a certain extent, by restricting firms’ ability to pay executives in bankruptcy in
significant ways.91
The bargaining dynamic for compensation in bankruptcy, however, has changed
significantly in the years since Bradley and Rosenzweig’s analysis. In order to better understand
whether managerial power is reduced in Chapter 11 compensation negotiations, we must
examine the pay-setting process for financially distressed firms. CEOs of almost all firms
(healthy and distressed) are routinely employed under multi-year contracts, which include
generous termination provisions or “golden parachutes” in the event the firm breaches the
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contract or fires the CEO for any reason. 92 Moreover, these contracts routinely have accelerated
vesting clauses for stock option plans and corporate loans/deferred compensation that are costly
for firms to pay out or unwind. These penalties limit the ability of healthy firms to reset CEO
compensation levels based on changed circumstances, such as decreased firm or individual
performance over the three to five years of the contract. These “recontracting costs” are a
potentially significant impediment to firms reaching efficient outcomes with respect to
employment contracts, since the net effect is a substantial disincentive for firms to terminate or
renegotiate CEO contracts. According to several finance scholars, these recontracting costs are
the primary source of inefficiency in the executive compensation market.93
Recontracting costs are reduced, if not eliminated, when a firm enters Chapter 11 because
CEO contracts are voidable by the debtor, no matter how they are written, how long they have
remaining in their term, or what type of compensation is spelled out. Nearly all forms of
compensation, including employment contracts, retention agreements, and golden parachutes, are
avoidable by the bankrupt firm, either as executory or prepetition contracts.94 This creates
substantial uncertainty and nervousness on the part of executives, who often have tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars at stake under these contracts.95 This nervousness is justified,
since with recontracting costs near zero, CEO contracts are often rejected by the debtor when the
firm first enters Chapter 11.96 There are, of course, still social and psychological pressures on
directors that can be costs that limit recontracting, but these are reduced or eliminated as well,
since sophisticated creditors often replace existing directors and take an active role in key
decision making, such as executive compensation.
Creditors of the debtor often are the drivers behind a firm’s decision to tear up a CEO’s
contract and take an active interest in negotiating new employment contracts. Firms entering
bankruptcy develop compensation strategies for rank-and-file employees and for senior
executives. The former are routinely maintained at pre-bankruptcy levels through a first day
“wage and benefit order” that is rarely disputed by the creditors’ committee and almost always
approved as a matter of course by the bankruptcy court. Compensating the CEO and other top
managers is more contentious for several reasons.
CEO compensation packages are a nontrivial amount for creditors trying to squeeze every
penny out of the debtor, especially for the firms examined in this study, which are relatively
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small and highly unprofitable. According to compensation consultants, lawyers, and distressed
investors interviewed for this study, direct costs alone are often sufficient to warrant additional
attention from creditors. Not only are cash costs significant for creditors (in 2000, CEO
compensation amounted to about 8 percent of corporate profits and about 17 percent of
dividends),97 but the size is amplified by the fact that creditors are fighting for every penny. As
one workout lawyer said:
It’s a dollar lost or a dollar gained . . . . You’re getting 10 cents on the dollar on
your claim and they want to give $10 million to the person who undoubtedly
played a role in the company filing for bankruptcy. Of course, your clients get
upset.98
Perhaps even more important than these costs, however, are indirect benefits that come
from finding the right executives and setting high-powered incentives for developing an effective
reorganization plan, maintaining the debtor’s business during Chapter 11, and setting a
successful business strategy for the firm. In addition, there are potentially significant intangible
benefits from renegotiating CEO pay levels during reorganization. Cutting executive pay is one
of the surest ways to signal that a firm is serious about change to creditors, customers,
competitors, and the courts.99 According to practitioners, creditors “want to assert [themselves]
early on to show that [they] are going to be driving the bus.”100
For these reasons, creditors often take the lead in renegotiating CEO contracts in
bankruptcy. These contracts are often negotiated over several months, and are a crucial part of
the reorganization plan. The importance of CEO employment contracts to creditors is apparent
from the fact that they are regularly included in reorganization plans and other public filings.101
As one vulture investor interviewed for this piece described:
A successful Chapter 11 investment for us is premised entirely on people. We find
the right managers, either inside or outside the firm; we tear up their employment
agreements and start over; we give them the right incentives; and we monitor their
performance.102
But is this creditor interest sufficient to overcome the substantial power managers are assumed to
have over the board and other elements of corporate governance? A variety of factors suggest
management power while others hint at creditor control over compensation negotiations.
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1. Management power
In terms of negotiations, there are several factors that do seem to cut in management’s
favor. First, there is the belief that the debtor is more valuable with existing management because
managers know the business best and have firm-specific skills or knowledge that makes them
superior managers than outsiders. This is precisely the logic that motivates allowing management
operation of the debtor, and is the argument commonly made by managers when asking for
lucrative compensation packages in bankruptcy, often in the form of so-called “key employee
retention plans” (KERPs).103
We will see below that this belief strains under the data, however, since CEOs are
replaced in and around bankruptcy in over 60 percent of firms in the dataset.104 While KERPs
may be useful to retain top line managers and sales personnel, their protective force is likely
much less for CEOs. These executives have more wealth tied up in the firm, are less able to jump
ship, and are, in most cases, less valuable in bankruptcy than line managers with the important
business contracts and functional knowledge.
Second, reorganizing firms are susceptible to poaching, since they are targeted by the rest
of industry for talent that might be eager to move to greener pastures. Turnover of managers
increases costs for the firm both in cash expenditures (in the form of search fees, hiring bonuses,
relocation expenses, etc.) and opportunity and disruption costs. Again, these latter costs are
probably less important for the CEO than for midlevel sales managers and business unit heads,
who are more numerous and have important line responsibilities, knowledge, and personal
customer contacts. Of course, any generalizations are impossible as the value of personnel at all
levels will vary across firms and industries.105
A third factor potentially favoring management is the possibility that creditors will
tolerate inefficient or unfair compensation levels/types to curry favor with CEOs (who have the
exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan) in order to get the company out of bankruptcy
as soon as possible. Creditors want to exit quickly to reduce three costs: cash costs (professional
fees for lawyers, accountants, bankers, etc.), business costs (lost customers), and financial costs
(higher capital costs). While the total of these costs is undoubtedly very large (professional fees
alone are about 2-4% of assets in a typical case),106 the relevant consideration is the marginal
costs of extending bankruptcy a certain period of time. The marginal costs of bankruptcy are not
directly related to duration in all cases, since while professional fees increase linearly with time,
other costs are lumpy, with extensions of reasonable periods unlikely to increase them
substantially. In addition, unlike one-time professional fees, executive compensation is a
recurring charge that cannot be externalized to the “last class of shareholders,” and therefore gets
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more scrutiny.107 Even if these costs are much greater than the expected savings from
recontracting with the CEO, this does not necessarily mean that this is the profit maximizing
strategy. There is a complicated tradeoff (with no obvious or generalizable solution) between
getting the right CEO and getting that CEO properly incentivized versus getting out quickly. For
example, while shortening the duration of the reorganization might reduce cash and other costs,
it is possible that the shortened time to make decisions will lead to inferior ones, resulting in
overall higher total costs in the long run. Creditors also want to maximize the value of the firm
upon their exit, be it sooner or later, and would be unlikely to approve employment agreements
that are poorly designed or that would not give key managers strong incentives to maximize firm
value.108
There is, of course, the possibility that firms would pay large, one-time bonuses as a bribe
to management, but this concern is largely overblown. These bonuses are usually paid only upon
successful emergence from Chapter 11, meaning they are incentives for timely, valuemaximizing reorganization of debts. They are also usually in an amount equal to a CEO’s annual
bonus pro rata over the time of the reorganization, and are therefore simply deferred bonus
payments contingent on a positive outcome.
A fourth pro-management factor is the fact that potential outside replacements would
demand higher compensation levels than current management (all else being equal), to
compensate for the increased risk from joining a failing firm. Consider a simple example: if the
going rate for an CEO is $100,000, but outsiders would demand a 20 percent premium to
compensate for the increased risk from running a bankrupt firm, the existing CEO could demand
an increase up to something less than $120,000 and still reduce the debtor’s overall costs.109
While this may seem reasonable in light of the extra risk and stress being borne by the CEO, it is
possible that the CEO is being paid in excess of her worth, since the labor market may value her
less than outsiders due to the taint of being affiliated with a failing enterprise.110 Given the
CEO’s poor performance, whether or not it can be deemed her “fault,” the firm should be able to
pay her less, but the costs of the next best alternative are so much higher that the CEO is actually
in a stronger negotiating position. This is also true for insiders who might be promoted to CEO,
who would face the same labor market dynamics.111 Again, however, the data do not support this
as a powerful factor in compensation negotiations. As discussed below, most CEOs are replaced
107
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in firms under financial distress and over 70 percent of CEO replacements are from outside the
debtor,112 suggesting that this is not a substantial factor in most cases.
2. Creditor power
On the other hand several factors severely limit the bargaining power of incumbent
managers. The most obvious limitation is the fact that the CEO will be viewed as bearing some
responsibility for the firm’s poor performance, which will undermine any case for a lucrative
compensation package. Not only does this depreciation of the CEO’s human capital impact her
bargaining position vis-à-vis her current employer, but it does so with respect to other employers
as well, therefore reducing the risk that the CEO will leave the firm.113 This is, as we will see,
also borne out by the data, with inside CEOs making considerably less than outside
replacements.114
In addition, firms have strategic and political incentives to bring in new management.
Firing existing management can send a strong signal to creditors, the market, and competitors
that the firm takes the reorganization process seriously and that the firm is confident about
emerging as a vibrant entity. Signaling with compensation is observed in firms conducting an
IPO, where the firm often forces risk-averse managers to accept contingent compensation as a
sign of confidence in the firm’s prospects.115 Firms in Chapter 11 engage in similar strategies,
increasing the use of contingent contracts (emergence is in a sense like an IPO) and reducing
certain compensation amounts to show constraint/monitoring of agency costs/problems.
Consistent with this signaling theory, we see firms looking more to outsiders as replacements for
CEOs, with about 70 percent of replacements coming from outside the firm.
Large CEO paydays in bankruptcy also generate what Bebchuk and Fried call “outrage
costs,” which should reduce CEO bargaining power. They predict that “[t]he more outrage a
compensation arrangement is expected to generate, the more reluctant directors will be to
approve it, and the more hesitant managers will be to propose it in the first instance.”116
Bankruptcy raises outrage costs substantially because of the frequency of job cuts by the debtor
juxtaposed with wealthy executives occasionally receiving lucrative retention bonuses, all being
done under the increased press scrutiny a bankruptcy filing brings.117 There are, for example,
frequent press reports calling CEO pay in bankrupt firms “malodorous,”118 and “blackmail,”119
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for these reasons.120 So the outrage theory would predict that CEOs of firms in financial distress
would, as a result of increasing outrage costs, face substantial reductions or realignments of their
compensation or would engage in extraordinary attempts to hide the true nature/cost of their
compensation. This claim is tested more fully below, but a recent example is illustrative. In its
recent financial distress, Delta Airlines faced a barrage of negative news stories about the pay of
its CEO, Leo Mullin. Delta proposed paying Mullin over $2 million per year, while the firm was
asking for asking its unions for substantial wage concessions. The public and internal outrage
was overwhelming, however, so Mullin agreed to waive his bonuses for two years and to give up
stock awards “potentially worth millions.”121
CEOs may also have strong incentives to stay with their current employer because of the
value of their employment agreements are tied to the firm. As discussed above, all elements of
the CEO’s compensation – salary, bonus, unvested options or stock, retirement benefits – are
executory contracts that the firm can accept or reject. Deferred compensation, which is typically
substantial,122 is also at risk. The acts of the debtor in the reorganization of Burlington Industries
is typical – the firm cancelled nearly all existing compensation arrangements with top
management as “unfunded . . . executory contracts,” making all payments on owed amounts
contingent on the employee remaining with the firm through the end of the reorganization.123
This threat encourages renegotiation and loyalty.
Management’s bargaining position is also constrained by the ability of creditors to readily
oust them. While shareholders theoretically have the power to throw out incompetent managers,
this is very rarely done in practice. Creditors, however, often contract for very specific rights to
replace managers if certain contingencies come to pass. Creditors also have the power to appoint
trustee to replace incumbent managers under § 1104(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. While this
happens in only a handful of big cases each year, it remains a “powerful leverage device”
because the risks to incumbent managers are so great.124 The bankruptcy court also has the
authority, on the motion of a party in interest, to appoint an examiner to investigate
management’s past practices.125 The risk of an audit, while also quite rare, also constrains
managerial overreaching because the potential downside for managers is so great.
Creditors also have the power to oppose management’s reorganization plan, either by
withholding their votes in favor or by actively campaigning/litigating against it, and this gives
them leverage over any decisions. Creditors “can conduct embarrassing discovery, expose the
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efforts of management or other parties to the reorganization to serve their self-interest, draw out
negotiations over the plan, and inject uncertainty into the confirmation process.”126 Creditors also
use their power as a lender of last resort to influence compensation negotiations. Banks can
refuse to loan the debtor essential funds to operate during reorganization or, as described above,
agree to loan money only if certain conditions with respect to personnel or contracts are met.127 A
related factor is the fact that debtors face cash constraints that may make them less able to pay
rich compensation packages to management. If managers have limited exit options, firms can
argue to management that the lack of cash limits the amount they can pay.128
B. Monitoring and Recontracting in Chapter 11
While the above discussion shows that managers retain some bargaining leverage,
creditors and other constituencies of the debtor play a much more active role in monitoring and
even managing the debtor in bankruptcy. The evidence shows that this monitoring role extends
into executive compensation decisions.
1. Creditors as monitors
Creditors committees are almost always involved in negotiating employment agreements
for existing or new management. While the debtor is technically responsible for drafting the
agreement and obtaining court approval, “the creditors’ committee’s fingerprints are [usually] all
over the proposal” since it is “typically prenegotiated with the committee.”129 Creditor
involvement in negotiating employment contracts begins in earnest when the debtor files for
Chapter 11. At that time there is a clear choice for the debtor and the creditors – adopt
management employment agreements as is or rip them up and start fresh. In nearly every case in
this study, the debtor chose to renegotiate the terms under which the CEO was employed. While
most employees are maintained at pre-petition levels of salary under first-day orders approved by
the bankruptcy court, the CEO’s employment contract typically waits until later. While
occasionally the negotiations begin pre-petition, in the vast majority of cases the debtor and the
creditors do not reach agreement on the terms of the CEO’s employment during and after the
reorganization until several months after the filing date. This is perhaps because, as shown in
section V below, most CEOs are replaced in and around bankruptcy, and creditors are often
engaged in a parallel search for a new CEO. In the meantime, vulture investors or bank creditors
often bring in turnaround specialists to manage the debtor.130 These managers are compensated as
a priority administrative expense under § 327, which allows the firm to have compensated and
incentivized management in place while negotiations with the new or current CEO are ongoing.
In addition, the existing CEO is unlikely to quit the firm in the absence of an employment
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contract, given the wealth (in the form of stock options, deferred compensation, and retirement
benefits) tied up in the firm, not to mention the reputation effects, which are likely to be
increasingly important for the CEO. Finally, as we will see, negotiations over CEO pay can often
be quite contentious, and the creditors committee may want to postpone a row over pay in order
to build harmonious relations with the debtor so as to better influence management’s
reorganization plan. Therefore, negotiations are often put on the back burner until negotiations
about the general scope of the plan are well along.
Starting from scratch, either with a new candidate or the existing CEO, creditors are
deeply involved in the pay setting process. According to compensation experts, creditors will
“scrutinize any retention package . . . and are likely to reject packages that seem excessive.”131
As a member of the unsecured creditors committee in the reorganization of Key3Media Group,
Inc. said recently, “I’m going to be looking very carefully at anything they’re going to pay any of
these guys.”132 This creditor involvement takes many observable forms.
First, creditors frequently file formal objections to the debtor’s pay plans with the
bankruptcy court, thus using the threat of litigation as a bargaining tactic. While judicial review
is generally ineffective as a constraint on executive compensation in healthy firms, as shown
below, in bankruptcy judicial oversight is often an effective tool for reducing or changing
executive pay. In addition to actually reviewing compensation packages, courts also serve as a
threat that motivates the creditors and the debtor to negotiate at arm’s-length. To cite a few of
many examples, in the reorganization of Drexel the creditors’ committee complained about a
proposed pay plan, causing Drexel to reduce proposed compensation by about 50 percent.133
Creditors also objected to executive compensation agreements for top management proposed by
debtor World Kitchen, Inc., causing the debtor to withdraw the proposal and the CEO to quit.134
The committee in the reorganization of FAO Schwartz filed papers with the court noting that its
was working with the debtor to create a compensation scheme “that is better tailored to the
Debtor’s current circumstances.”135 According to investors involved in this case, this was
because the parties were afraid of potential litigation, and wanted to prepare an acceptable set of
compensation packages that would expedite court approval.136 A similar objection was made by
creditors in the ongoing reorganization of Owens Corning, where a multi-million dollar bonus
plan for top executives was proposed by the debtor.137
The second type of creditor involvement is direct negotiations with the debtor. There are
two causes of these negotiations. The first is the threat of judicial review discussed above.
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Creditor approval is not a necessary precondition for judicial approval of executive pay
packages, but courts often cite such approval as important evidence of the fairness and propriety
of the packages in question.138 This provides strong incentives for the debtor to seek the
imprimatur of the various committees before submitting pay packages to the court for approval.
The other driver of negotiations is the power creditors have over the reorganization process
itself. Creditors, either large holders acting alone or smaller holders working in confederation
through the committee process, are frequently able to have an effective veto over approval of any
reorganization plan, which gives them substantial bargaining power over key management
decisions, including compensating top managers. As one observer noted about modern
reorganization practice, “[c]reditor lawyers are questioning pay packages, and, in some cases,
they refuse to move reorganization plans forward until executive retention agreements are
settled.”139 These challenges can often be quite effective, as in the recent case of Peregrine
Systems, where a “challenge by the creditors’ committee kept [the debtor] from realizing all of
its retention and bonus payment goals.”140
Another form of creditor involvement in compensation decisions is through the board of
directors. The influence on boards is both direct and indirect. Creditors often take board seats in
the reorganized entity, which gives them power over compensation during and after Chapter 11.
For example, in the reorganization of Bruno’s, Inc., the largest creditors – a bank syndicate – had
the authority to appoint all three directors of the reconstituted board of directors.141 Creditors
took control of the board or at least some seats in most of the firms in the dataset, including:
Chiquita, where the “bondholders [got to] elect five members of a seven-member board and the
chairman”; Edison Brothers, where representatives from two creditors took board seats; and
Conseco, where the reorganization plan “eliminate[d] the current board and replace[d] it with a
seven-member panel controlled by the creditors.”142 Board changes are achieved formally
through contract, in the reorganization plan, or by rewriting the debtor’s charter or by-laws to
permit, or even require, creditors to nominate directors to stand for office. For example, in the
ongoing reorganization of USAir, the largest creditor, the Retirement System of Alabama,
bargained for 7 seats on a 12-member board as part of a deal providing the debtor with a cash
infusion.143 Directors are also sometimes replaced as a result of informal negotiations between
creditors and the debtor that are not memorialized in a written agreement, or even by threats to
marginalize or fire the director after the creditor gains control of the firm.144
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Indirectly, creditors can influence the board in the same way that the managerial power
theorists allege CEOs dominate the boards of healthy firms. When firms file to reorganize under
Chapter 11 or are otherwise in the “zone” or “vicinity” of insolvency, the fiduciary duties of the
board unquestionably switch from shareholders to creditors, with the concomitant obligation to
maximize the estate of the debtor for their benefit.145 While one might think that CEO
domination of the directors would continue unabated regardless of this theoretical, legal change,
there is reason to believe that boards’ allegiances do change and they are able to overcome any
supposed capture by the CEO. This is because, as discussed above, creditors play a more active
role in monitoring the firm than shareholders in healthy firms. This includes actively
communicating with the board on key matters, including personnel issues. This jawboning can
be quite effective, given creditors powerful position in the reorganization process and directors’
changing loyalties.146 Creditors can also oust directors or promise (implicitly or explicitly)
rewards or punishment of various kinds. In other words, creditors in this situation have precisely
the same power and influence as the CEOs in healthy firms that managerial power scholars find
objectionable.
2. Directors as monitors
The enhanced monitoring role of directors in these cases is not simply derivative of the
power of creditors. Directors of financially distressed firms have greater incentives to monitor
compensation practices as firm performance deteriorates and the firm approaches insolvency,
even without creditor jawboning or influence. In healthy firms, directors are nearly always
shielded from personal liability for bad decisions by a hierarchy of protections: the presumption
of good faith found in the business judgment rule, the waiver of liability – a form of selfinsurance – found in nearly all corporate charters, and finally indemnification and third-party
insurance policies taken out by the firm to reimburse directors found liable for all expenses,
fines, and fees. A recent study by Black, Cheffins, and Klausner, found that this litany of
protections effectively eliminates any risk of out-of-pocket liability for even terrible directors.147
In bankruptcy, however, these protections are much less effective at protecting directors, if at all.
Therefore, directors are bound to be more conscientious and diligent, especially regarding issues
of CEO compensation where there is obvious risk of self-dealing.
As mentioned above, director loyalty begins to shift from shareholders to creditors as the
firm enters the “vicinity of insolvency.” This change has profound affects on the standards of
review courts use to evaluate potential director liability, and thus can be expected to have real
impact on director behavior and monitoring incentives. The most obvious example is the
applicability of the business judgment rule. If directors are given the shield of the business
judgment rule, decisions approving executive compensation agreements will be respected absent
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a breach of their fiduciary duties of good faith, loyalty, and due care.148 In other words, absent
self-dealing, director decisions on how much and how to pay a CEO will be protected from
judicial inquiry and potential liability.
It is not clear, however, whether the business judgment rule applies to shield director
decisions in the “zone of insolvency” in the same way that it does for healthy firms. Courts are
split on whether the business judgment rule applies at all for director actions in financially
distressed firms. While some courts have held that the standards of review of director action are
the same in and out of bankruptcy,149 other courts consider directors de facto trustees for the
creditors, and apply a higher standard of scrutiny to their actions.150 In addition, those courts that
do apply the business judgment rule limit it to certain types of decisions or modify it to meet the
particular circumstances of the case.151 For example, courts reviewing director action regarding
extraordinary transactions (such as approval of break-up fees) occasionally refuse to give the
directors the benefit of the business judgment rule, or apply a modified, more stringent
standard.152 While executive compensation decisions would normally be considered in the
“ordinary course of business,” this might not be the case for extraordinary retention or
emergence bonuses or new employment contracts. In addition, courts sometimes scrutinize pay
packages under a modified business judgment standard since the obvious final period problems
for executives present opportunities for self-dealing at the expense of shareholders and creditors.
Given the heightened scrutiny of bankruptcy, practitioners recommend “directors and officers of
an insolvent or near-insolvent corporation should proceed with corporate decisions on the
assumption that the business judgment rule will not apply . . . .”153
Directors have reason to be more active monitors even when the business judgment rule
applies, however, because courts are willing to strip directors of its protections more freely in
cases where the firm is in financial distress. The recent case of Pereira v. Cogan is illustrative. In
Pereira, the CEO, who was also controlling shareholder, awarded himself a huge compensation
package as the firm headed toward liquidation under Chapter 7. The board approved the
disbursements in perfunctory fashion, without detailed analysis and often relying on reports from
others. When deciding whether to apply the business judgment rule, the court examined the
process followed by the directors, as well as the substance of their decisions. This type of
peeking under the covers is already a more searching review of director actions than courts
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usually apply.154 Ultimately, the court refused to defer to the business judgment of the directors,
finding that it did not decide on many of the compensation issues (and hence there were no
decisions to defer to) and that the decisions it did make were so procedurally deficient as not to
warrant deference.155 The directors were found personally liable for about $10 million. The
lesson from this line of cases for directors is that courts’ hands-off attitude for most corporate
decisions doesn’t necessarily obtain in bankruptcy, and that bad decisions can result in personal
liability.
To make matters worse, directors cannot necessarily avoid this personal liability with
standard exculpatory provisions designed to limit director liability. The articles of incorporation
of nearly all publicly traded firms eliminate director liability for duty of care violations, as
permitted by statutes in most states.156 These exculpatory provisions are the second line of
defense for directors in case the shield of the business judgment rule is pierced. But courts do not
always enforce exculpatory agreements against creditors in bankruptcy.157 The stated reason is
that these provisions are contractual bargains between shareholders and directors to which the
firm’s creditors are not a party, and therefore cannot be bound.158 In addition, these provisions
typically address only claims brought on behalf of shareholders or the corporation itself, and do
not mention potential liability to creditors.159 Whether or not this logic is sensible,160 the fact that
courts limit the reach of these exculpatory provisions in bankruptcy gives directors extra
incentive to monitor CEO compensation more closely in these cases.
The lack of firm self-insurance through exculpatory provisions is exacerbated by the
potential failure of the last line of director defense – third-party insurance that would pay any
liabilities if directors were found liable. As with exculpatory provisions, nearly all large, publicly
held firms purchase insurance for the legal liabilities of directors and officers while serving in a
corporate capacity (“D&O” insurance). These policies, which are authorized by state statutes,161
typically reimburse directors for all out-of-pocket expenses, including legal fees and money
judgments. These insurance policies are a powerful disincentive to aggressive oversight by
directors, since they lower the cost to directors from poor performance. The D&O insurance
shield, however, may be nonexistent or limited in cases involving bankrupt or near insolvent
firms. Depending on the type of insurance and the particular circumstances of the case, “a
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corporation’s bankruptcy may change the degree to which, or even whether, certain D&O
insurance policies will cover directors and officers of a financially distressed company.”162
The end result is not a clear dismantling of director protections in all cases, but rather
significant questions about how effective such protections will be in the case of financially
distressed firms. In terms of director incentives, this blurriness of outcomes likely causes more
caution, and thus more monitoring, on behalf of directors. This is probably true even for directors
who were previously captured by or mere instrumentalities of the CEO. Remember that the
managerial power argument assumes that directors are beholden to the CEO because the CEO
has the power over appointment of directors, is able to reward cooperative directors with perks
and favors, and because of various social and psychological influences. While arguably true in
some cases with some firms, these forces constraining directorial power are less persuasive when
directors face a real, monetary downside as well.
***
A final note about director monitoring is worth mentioning. The managerial power critics
claim that directors (at least in healthy firms) are ineffective monitors of executive compensation
because (1) they spend “little time” focusing on the issue and (2) they “do not have the
knowledge and expertise that is needed to properly evaluate the compensation arrangements they
are asked to approve.”163 The claim is that directors are largely ignorant about the details of the
compensation packages they approve. According to Yale business school professor Jeffrey
Sonnenfeld:
I know that a lot of time board members don’t understand the complexity of the
documents they’re reviewing. People don’t want to look foolish by asking how
some of the instruments work.164
While this claim strains credibility in healthy firms,165 it is especially unlikely in firms in
financial distress. As we’ve seen, the largest creditors often replace the existing directors with
their own representatives. These new directors are routinely senior executives in the investment
firm who serve or have served as directors for other distressed firms, have unmatched financial
savvy, and are betting their own money on the success of the debtor.166 These new directors are
not susceptible to either criticisms about time or knowledge. Moreover, even if they are only a
minority on the board, there are likely to have an influence on the board decision making
because of the time and understanding they will bring to board meetings.167

162

See Richard M. Cieri & Michael J. Riela, Protecting Directors and Officers of Corporations that are Insolvent or in the Zone
or Vicinity of Insolvency: Important Considerations, Practical Solutions, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 295, 330 (2004).
163
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 44-45.
164
Id. at 45.
165
As Ken Langone recently wrote regarding the flap over Richard Grasso’s pay at the NYSE, “[I]t is absurd to suggest that the
[directors, some of the] brightest minds and keenest thinkers on Wall Street [were] befuddled by the complexity of Richard
Grasso’s compensation package – especially one composed just like their own.” Kenneth Langone, Let’s Bring on the Jury, Mr.
Spitzer, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2004, at A12.
166
For example, four members of the buyout firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. were elected to serve on the board of debtor
Borden Chemical. See Borden Chemical 2003 10-K.
167
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 37 (2004).

35

DRAFT – 8/28/06

Even when directors are not replaced by representatives of large creditors, the criticisms
about time and knowledge are not persuasive in the bankruptcy context. As mentioned above,
director attention is more focused in bankruptcy because of increased oversight of their actions
(by creditors, the media, the courts) and the threat of liability for bad decisions. This solves (at
least) the problem of inattention. As for lack of knowledge, bankruptcy raises the saliency of
compensation issues, which is a spur to information on executive pay being provided.
Compensation decisions are very important in bankruptcy, and as such are often made by full
board instead of being delegated to compensation committee.168 Directors demand data and
information on executive pay to avoid criticisms and potential legal liability, while accounting
firms and other compensation consultants actively provide a ready supply of information,
including assessments of various pay strategies, comparisons between types of options and other
pay mechanisms, design and operation of KERPs, and overall approach to compensation in
bankruptcy. These firms are competing for business based on the quality of the information they
provide, and their materials “provide firms with everything one would need to know about the
latest thinking on compensation issues.”169 Directors, especially the members of the
compensation committee, thus have access to an abundance of information and strong incentives
to educate themselves about compensation issues.
3. Judges as Monitors
Another constraint on managerial power over compensation bargaining in Chapter 11 is
the direct oversight of the bankruptcy court. The most obvious manifestation of this power is the
court’s review of executory contracts pursuant to § 365(a) of the Code: “subject to the court’s
approval, [the debtor-in-possession] may assume or reject any executory contract . . . of the
debtor.” Because compensation agreements are executory contracts, the rejection or adoption of
any contract must be approved by the bankruptcy court.
While this leaves open the possibility of perfunctory review, in fact, courts do routinely
analyze the substance of executive compensation agreements. Judicial influence takes two forms.
The hard form is a formal review and adjudication of the propriety and fairness of proposed
compensation plans, raised either by a “party in interest” or sua sponte. More typically, courts
engage in a softer form of oversight, using the significant leverage of a threat of official action to
force the parties to alter the terms of contracts. This mere threat lowers re-contracting costs for
the firm since it raises the cost to the firm and the manager of excessive agreements, and lowers
the psychological or social norm barriers to renegotiation or tougher negotiating. For example,
directors can force the CEO to renegotiate without losing face by blaming their action on the
possible threat of litigation or court involvement.
Outside the bankruptcy context, judicial review of executive compensation is quite
limited because “the size and structure of executive compensation are inherently matters of
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judgment,” entitled to “great deference” by courts.170 While some cases exist in which courts
have invalidated compensation agreements,171 judicial review is not a meaningful constraint on
negotiations outside of the Chapter 11 context.
Courts exert much more power over compensation decisions for bankrupt firms. In fact,
under Chapter X of the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act, prior court approval was required for all
executive compensation contracts.172 The logic behind requiring prior court approval of
compensation was “so that the retention of the debtor’s officers will be based on their actual
worth and not on their desire to perpetuate their tenure or control at the expense of the . . .
creditors and stockholders.”173 In a notable, pre-1978 Act case, the court rejected specific
elements of an officer’s employment contract with the debtor on the ground that prior court
approval was not granted, and this was required by § 191 “to safeguard the administration of the
debtor’s property in the custody of the court.”174
The new Bankruptcy Code rejected this paternalistic approach to compensation as part of
a broader policy change away from court control and toward court supervision. The grounds for
this reform sounded largely in matters of institutional competency, preservation of judicial
resources, and the benefits of private resolution of business decisions. 175 Despite the fairly clear
congressional intent to get judges out of the day-to-day business of running bankrupt firms,
courts nevertheless continue to review compensation levels much as they had under the pre-1978
Act. While the new Code does not explicitly and unambiguously grant judges the power to
approve or change management compensation, most courts find the authority to do so in a grab
bag of code provisions. For example, many courts interpret § 327 (as well as §§ 328 and 330),
which authorizes the court to approve compensation of “professional persons,” like lawyers,
bankers, and accounts, to allow similar review of executive compensation.176 It seems clear that
this provision applies to third party specialists and not officers of the debtor, but some courts use
it as a hook to increase their supervisory role. Recognizing this reasoning strains the language
and structure of the new Code, one court explained, although “the Code contains no provision
analogous to § 191 of the Act, . . . the substance of that section has arguably been incorporated in
. . . § 327(a)” of the Code.177 Courts not relying on § 327 nevertheless find the requisite power in
the Code’s general provisions allowing courts to enter any order “necessary or appropriate to
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carry out the provisions” of the Code.178 These courts take a fairly active role in adjudicating
compensation issues.
Many courts under the new Code have exercised the power to reject proposed
employment agreements and reduce compensation of the debtor’s employees.179 As a procedural
matter, the typical case is brought by creditors, usually acting through the creditors’ committee.
Creditors have standing as a “party in interest,” and their objections are routinely supported by
lengthy reports from compensation experts. Alternatively, courts can raise issues about the
propriety or fairness of executive compensation sua sponte. For example, the court in In re New
York City Shoes, Inc., reduced the compensation of the debtor’s CFO, despite the fact that neither
the debtor nor the creditors’ committee objected to the form or amount of the compensation.180
Courts are split on the question of where to place the burden of proof, a key determinant
of the level of review. Some find that employment agreements at pre-petition levels are
presumptively valid, although this presumption can be overcome with evidence that the contracts
are not in the best interest of the estate.181 Other courts play a more active role in reducing or
changing executive compensation, even when the proposed compensation was the same at prepetition levels.182 In general, when extraordinary contracts are proposed to the court for review
under a so-called “§ 363(b) proceeding,” courts decide whether “a sound business purpose”
justifies the debtor’s compensation plan.183 This is all much more scrutiny than in healthy firms.
This increased judicial monitoring of compensation is shown in several recent, highprofile reorganizations. In the WorldCom bankruptcy, the court reviewed the compensation of
new CEO Michael Capellas, ultimately reducing it by about 25 percent over three years.184 The
judge in that case said the package “raises serious concerns as to whether proposed new
management is committed to reform as the nature of this requires.”185 This is not a recent or
occasional phenomenon. Courts have consistently played an active role in supervising
compensation packages of top executives. To cite just a few examples, the bankruptcy judge
presiding over the reorganization of A.H. Robins Co. reduced compensation of senior officers
and directors, lowering the annual salary of the CEO by 20 percent.186 Likewise, the court in the
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reorganization of Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., approved a broad-based “key employee retention
plan,” but rejected a compensation and bonus plan for eight top executives after objections from
trade creditors. Courts also have the power to undo agreements. The court supervising the
reorganization of Coram Healthcare, Inc., rejected a transition employment agreement entered
into with creditors, and authorized the Chapter 11 trustee to seek reimbursement from the
CEO.187
In addition to formal review, bankruptcy judges exercise indirect influence over
executive compensation. This power, and willingness to use it, reinforces the negotiations among
creditors and the debtor by evening out any bargaining asymmetries between management on the
one side and directors and/or creditors on the other side. For example, in the bankruptcy of failed
retailer Caldor, the judge objected to a proposed management compensation plan, noting that the
plan would “reward emergence for emergence’s sake” without considering the health of the firm
after emergence. Although the judge did not rule on the plan, Caldor renegotiated a more
acceptable bonus plan with shareholders and creditors.188 Another example was in case of C.R.
Anthony Co. where the judge expressed significant concern about approving a compensation
package for the CEO that would reward him for mismanaging the company.189 Likewise, the
judge overseeing reorganization of Peregrine Systems “sent the company back to the drawing
board” on requests for some executive compensation.190
4. Other Monitors
There are several other constraints on managerial power in Chapter 11 that are worth
briefly mentioning. As discussed above, employee activism, often through labor unions or other
representatives, raise outrage costs for CEOs in Chapter 11 cases.191 Labor unions, where active,
frequently evaluate and criticize executive compensation plans in Chapter 11. Formal objections
have been used in recent airline, steel, and telecommunications bankruptcies.192 Informal public
statements and intrafirm signals also raise outrage costs and focus attention (either of the court or
powerful creditors) on executive compensation issues.193 For example, several employees of
debtor Guilford Mills sent a letter to the bankruptcy court “vehemently” opposing a proposed
executive retention plan, thus focusing the court’s attention on the plan.194 These tactics raise the
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costs of outrageous executive compensation, and push the parties in the direction of arm’s-length
contracting over compensation.
Another constraint is the threat of litigation to recover “excessive” or illegal
compensation. Courts have recently allowed cases to proceed against the executives of bankrupt
firms on theories of fraudulent conveyance for certain compensation packages.195 Take the
example of a CEO of a corporation who one day before the filing of a bankruptcy petition
received payments from the firm totaling over $50 million for services rendered by him, by his
family, by affiliated companies, and for payment of his questionable legal expenses.196 The
potential for abuse in this “final period” is obvious, since the CEO can enrich himself at the
expense of the firm and its creditors without reliable recourse if the firm fails.197 To prevent this,
the firm or the bankruptcy trustee can avoid transfers of this type under several sections of the
Bankruptcy Code or under state law.198
***
The traditional view of executive compensation in bankruptcy—that Chapter 11 serves as
an anti-takeover device for managers, allowing managers to rent seek at the expense of
shareholders and creditors—is no longer true. Chapter 11 now “has a distinctly creditor-oriented
cast,” and today’s reorganizations look more like the market for corporate control where
creditors provide powerful oversight of managerial conduct and prevent excessive rent
seeking.199 One would therefore expect the data about executive compensation in bankrupt firms
to show some evidence of active recontracing by firms and for the results of the recontracting to
approximate the contracts one would expect to see result from arm’s-length negotiations. Let us
turn now to the data to see if these hypotheses prove to be true.
V. AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT COMPENSATION IN FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED FIRMS

A. The data
The data sample for this study consists of 76 large, publicly traded firms that faced severe
financial distress during the period 1992 to 2003 – 68 firms filed to reorganize under Chapter 11
while 8 privately restructured their debt.200 The data about compensation levels, types, and
methods is primarily from the EXECUCOMP database, a repository of executive compensation
and other data on the largest 1500 publicly traded firms. This database is the accepted standard
for research in this area. It is incomplete, however, with respect to firms in Chapter 11 due to the
195
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lack of some publicly available information, as well as a change in the way this information is
reported for firms in Chapter 11, which leaves some holes in the data. To fill in the holes, the
dataset was supplemented with research from a variety of public sources (e.g., proxy statements
and 10-Ks filed with the SEC, reorganization plans filed with the bankruptcy court, and press
releases and public comments) as well as a series of interviews conducted with lawyers and
distressed debt investors that worked on these deals, as well as executives of firms in the sample.
These interviews provided raw data, color, insights, and corroboration on the other data sources
used.
As shown on Table 1, the 76 financially distressed firms in the data set are small,
shrinking, and unprofitable relative to the other firms in the rest of the EXECUCOMP database.

TABLE 1

Characteristics of financially distressed firms

Characteristic
Asset value ($ billions)
Sales ($ billions)
Sales growth (y-y; percent)
Net income ($ billions)
Total return to shareholders (3 year; percent)

Mean values
Financially
distressed
firms
All firms
3.8
19.8
2.3
6.3
-7
9
-0.4
0.5
-22
5

In terms of the amount of executive pay, there is significant difference in total compensation
between the two data sets, with larger, more successful firms paying their executives more. Over
the period, the average compensation (salary plus bonus and options granted) for financially
distressed firms grew at a rate of about 5 percent per year, while the growth rate for all firms was
about 10 percent per year. The faster growth rate suggests a crude, big-picture linkage between
pay and performance – the larger, more successful firms pay, on average, more than smaller,
distressed firms. This is explained almost entirely by the difference in the value of options
awarded, as shown below. The differences in compensation levels between healthy and
distressed firms are not meaningful in terms of the analysis, however, in that this paper compares
compensation levels and methods at distressed firms before, during, and after financial distress.
Over the ten-year period, most of the firms spent several years outside of the “zone of
insolvency,” (on either side of the filing), thus permitting an isolation of the impacts of
bankruptcy.
B. CEO turnover
Before examining compensation, let us look at CEO turnover, which tells us something
about the relative bargaining power of CEOs and firm “owners” in compensation negotiations.
The traditional view, as noted above, is that Chapter 11 is an entrenchment mechanism for
managers that allows them to stay in power and extract rents from the firm. We have seen
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theoretical and anecdotal evidence that this is no longer true, with the new Chapter 11
foreshadowing the replacement of managers and directors. The data bolsters this conclusion,
with over 60 percent of CEOs being replaced in the “zone of insolvency.” This turnover rate
contrasts sharply with CEO turnover of less than 10 percent in solvent firms.201 Creditors are
clearly exercising their substantial theoretical power outlined above to discipline managers. This
threat of replacement also unquestionably constrains managerial overreaching in compensation
negotiations in the zone of insolvency.
The turnover rate in this study is also somewhat higher than that of previous work. Gilson
and Vetsuypens found a turnover rate of about 30 percent for firms in financial distress during
the period 1981 to 1987.202 The much higher rate for firms in this study (1992-2003) is consistent
with the overall thesis that bankruptcy has changed in two fundamental ways: first, the
liberalization of the distressed debt market has allowed vulture investors and other creditors to
play a much more active role in monitoring and disciplining managers; and second, the nature of
firms in financial distress has changed from firms with good management and bad balance sheets
to firms with both bad management and bad balance sheets.
Another interesting piece of data is the fact that almost 70 percent of CEO replacements
are firm outsiders. This data supports the signaling theory described above, whereby firms
replace managers in part because doing so evinces a seriousness about the reorganization process
and the firm’s future prospects. It is consistent, although somewhat higher than the data from the
1980s (less than 60 percent outsiders), suggesting weakly that the importance of the
informational component of personnel decisions has increased over time.203
C. Compensation types and methods
We are now positioned to examine the content of compensation bargains to see what they
tell us about agency cost theories. If CEO employment contracts look the same before distress,
when agency costs and managerial power are high, as after distress, when, as shown above, they
are greatly reduced, this suggests one of two possibilities. First, compensation contracts in
healthy firms are “optimal”, meaning that they fairly replicate the results one would expect from
arm’s-length bargaining. The second possibility is that the contracts are “efficient”, meaning that
they are the best we can expect given the costs, even with an increased role for judges, boards,
and investors. There may be many reasons why the contracts written by near-principal agents are
not likely to be different from those written by less motivated agents. For example, Jensen and
Murphy argue “cultural practice” is a powerful reason why firms do not have provisions that
limit CEO rights to unwind incentive contracts.204 In a similar vein, Randolph Beatty argues that
“aspects of top executive compensation . . . in large corporations may often be the result of
historical tradition and bureaucratization.”205 There is substantial evidence that contractual forms
201
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can be quite sticky, even irrationally so.206 Additional explanations are also possible, such as
inertia and cognitive biases and heuristics of decision makers, be they the board or other owners
or stakeholders. Reading dozens of reports from compensation committees, one finds a similarity
in language (if not actual text), style, and approach, which suggests some boiler-plate aspects to
the work, or at least the reporting of the work. In this sense the form of compensation can be
“sticky.” If one believes these are behind the similarity in compensation methodology, however,
the proposed solutions to reform allegedly excessive compensation—to increase the power of
institutional investors to act as a counterbalance to managerial power—is unlikely to help. If
distressed debt investors with strong statutory, judicial, and customary rights cannot overcome
managerial power over compensation in this context, then no investors under any conceivable
reforms are likely to do so for healthy firms.
1. General contracts
To test these hypotheses, this section examines the structural content of employment
contracts of the firms in this dataset before and after distress.207 Overall and in general, predistress contracts look nearly identical to post-distress contracts, and to contracts in healthy firms
that did not experience financial distress.208 In other words, sophisticated institutional investors
with huge stakes in the firm write CEO employment contracts (from scratch!) that look exactly
like contracts written by healthy firms with higher agency costs: they have multi-year terms, are
automatically renewable, pay a fixed salary, provide for generous performance-based bonuses,
use large grants of at-the-money options and restricted stock, allow reloading and repricing of
options, and grant lucrative severance/retirement benefits. Let us look at the elements of typical
contracts.
General terms: The vast majority of healthy firms use multi-year, written contracts to
employ their CEOs.209 The fact that executives can lock in their employment for several years on
favorable terms has been criticized by some corporate observers as evidence of excessive
managerial power in compensation negotiations.210 We see, however, that long-term contracts are
used in the post-distress period as commonly as they are for healthy firms or in pre-distress
periods: about 90 percent of the firms in this study in the pre-distress period. The contracts
written by creditors look identical in length and scope to those of healthy firms in the Schwab
and Thomas study – these contracts are 2 to 5 years in length and are typically automatically
renewable in one-year increments after the initial term expires. This is not to say that contracts
206
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before and after are identical. Some renegotiation did take place and some firms did alter the
basic contract form in minor ways. For example, debtor American Banknote wrote a new
employment contract with the same length as its pre-distress contract, but removed the automatic
renewal provision.211 Other firms changed the length of the term for various reasons, sometimes
making it shorter and sometimes longer.212 Again, we see recontracting and firms writing
contracts anew, but little or no change in the terms.
The contracts of healthy firms and pre-distress firms also provide for a fixed salary
regardless of performance (with a one-way “up” ratchet), and a discretionary bonus (as a
multiple of the employee’s salary), payable only if certain firm performance criteria are met.
Rewritten, post-distress contracts are the same as other contracts, with all providing a fixed
salary and nearly all providing performance-based bonuses.213 As above, firms do make a few
changes after experiencing financial distress. For example, while healthy firms use primarily
financial bonus metrics, distressed firms include non-financial metrics, such as making debt
payments, conducting asset sales, and emerging from distress.214 In addition, in some cases
bonuses are a guaranteed element of compensation, payable from KERP plans. These changes
are not, however, significant rejections of pre-distress terms. All in all, the basic structure of
employment contracts is the same before and after distress, as well as the same as employment
contracts for firms outside of the dataset.
Equity components: While critics point to multi-year terms, guaranteed salaries, and big
bonuses as evidence of managerial power, the bulk of criticism is reserved for the way firms
reward executives with various forms of equity compensation. While some populist-minded
critics point solely to the size of option awards as evidence of greed or wrongdoing, a more
powerful criticism is that commonly used options are inefficiently designed to properly motivate
managers. The argument, made by Bebchuk among others, is that non-indexed, at-the-money
options reward executives for market- or industry-wide rises in stock prices instead of linking
pay specifically with idiosyncratic firm performance.215
There are two proposed solutions: to use either performance-priced or “indexed” stock
options. The first type is simply options whose exercise or strike price is set above market price
in order to give recipients incentives to raise the stock price before profiting. As one firm that
uses this type option reports, this strategy gives executives rewards only for “superior results.”216
According to recent research “giving managers out-of-the-money options rather than at-themoney options does, on average, boosts firm value.”217 Thus, the argument goes, the failure to
use these options can only be explained by managerial rent seeking. This hypothesis is not born
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out by the data in this study. About 95 percent of firms in the dataset used conventional options
in the pre-distress period, which is fairly representative of pricing policies generally, and no firm
changed its option pricing policy after agency costs were reduced.218
Although corporate critics believe premium-priced options to be better than at-the-money
options, they “still have the potential to reward executives even in situations where they are not
performing well simply because the market is strong.”219 Accordingly, the strongest call for
reform is the use of “indexed” options. These are options with a variable exercise price that is
determined by comparing firm performance with an index of competitor firms – only when the
firm outperforms its rivals by some predetermined amount will the options be “in the money.”
The belief is that “indexed options can generate more incentive per dollar . . . by tightening the
link between compensation and performance.”220 Critics believe the case is so strong for using
indexed options that the only explanation for their absence from typical employment contracts is
managerial power: “as long as managers can get away with the use of conventional options, they
will do so.”221
And yet when managers can’t get away with it, when sophisticated investors with large
stakes and who know about the alleged benefits of indexed options222 write new employment
contracts, firms use traditional options, that is, at-the-money, non-indexed options. In all cases in
the dataset, the debtor used stock options in the pre-filing period, cancelled existing stock options
upon the occurrence of distress, and issued new options under new terms after reorganization.223
None of them used indexed options in either period. Moreover, other stock option characteristics,
such as vesting periods (3, 4, or 5 years), expiration dates (10 years), and stock holding
requirements (several percent), were generally the same before and after distress.
Alternative explanations for the lack of appeal of indexed options have been made well
by others. These include: there is already implicit indexing in CEO stock portfolios due to
managerial risk aversion and the fact that human capital is nondiversifiable;224 they are costly to
implement due to the need for an observable, non-manipulable index and are complex to handle
from an accounting standpoint;225 they may create excessive risk preferences on the part of
218
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managers;226 and that they don’t work as intended.227 Given that sophisticated investors choose
not to issue indexed options when they hold all the cards, it is more likely that one or a
combination of these alternative explanations instead of managerial power is the reason why they
are not used.
Not only do firms not implement indexing when agency costs are reduced, some of the
changes they do make are, in the view of the managerial power theorists, steps in the wrong
direction. For example, the only thing worse than non-indexed, at-the-money options according
to these critics is restricted stock, which has an exercise price of zero, and therefore provides no
incentive effects to recipients. About 60 percent of firms in the dataset used restricted stock in
the pre-distress period, but several that did not use it in the pre-distress period chose to issue
restricted stock in post-distress contracts.228 Only one firm—Acme Metals—chose to eliminate
the use of restricted stock.
There are several other characteristics of standard option contracts that critics claim are
explained largely by excessive managerial power, including the lack of contractual restrictions
on the ability of CEOs to unwind options through hedging. Bebchuk and Fried bemoan the lack
of unwinding restrictions in CEO contracts, arguing that their absence allows CEOs to “weaken .
. . (if not eliminat[e]) the incentive effects of the option grant by selling an equivalent number of
shares they already own.”229 According to a recent study of hundreds of employment contracts in
healthy firms, no firms have such restrictions despite this being “the natural place where
corporations could make CEOs promise not to unwind their stock option positions using
derivative securities.”230 Bebchuk and Fried point to this failure as evidence of excessive
managerial power, and argue that reducing agency costs by empowering shareholders and boards
to be more active would change contracting behavior in this area. Jensen and Murphy echo this,
noting that they “have been mystified for many years why boards do not formally restrict
managers’ freedom to unwind the incentives the [board] constructs for them.”231 But no firms in
the dataset placed any contractual restrictions on CEO portfolio management when creditors
rewrote employment contracts, suggesting that there are other forces at work besides high agency
costs.
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Table 2
Summary statistics of sample contract terms for firms in financial distress
Number of firms with
substantially the same
terms
Term
N Pre-distress Post-distress Change
Multi-year contract
40 35
34
1
Fixed salary, performance bonus
41 39
33
6*
At-the-money, non-indexed options
38 36
36
0
Restricted stock
37 22
21
1
Long-term incentive programs/severance
38 38
38
0
Change of control provisions
34 34
34
0
* Each of these was a change from performance bonus to guaranteed bonus or emergence bonus
during the reorganization
Retirement elements: The final part of compensation packages that raises the ire of critics is
the lucrative retirement and severance provisions these contracts offer.232 A recent expose in the
New York Times condemned generous retirement plans, quoting an investor advocate as asking:
“[W]hat's the point of paying somebody after they're gone?”233 The elements that managerial
power theorists find particularly objectionable include: large amounts of deferred compensation
and severance packages, change of control provisions that accelerate option vesting and provide
big cash payouts in the event of a merger or sale of the firm, and lucrative consulting deals for
CEOs in retirement. While on the surface there appears much to fault in the design of some CEO
retirement benefits, firm owners did not in most cases take advantage of reduced recontracting
costs and reduced managerial power to alter these benefits. Some firms changed the form of
retirement benefits—e.g., moving from defined-benefit pension plans to lump sum deferred
compensation under KERP plans—but the general nature of retirement benefits looked the same
before and after distress in over 90 percent of cases. Post-distress contracts contained large
deferred cash plans, long-term incentive plans consisting mostly of mega-grants of company
stock, extremely generous pension payments, and consulting contracts in the same manner and
frequency as pre-distress and healthy firms. For example, debtor Covanta Energy entered into an
agreement, approved by creditors and the bankruptcy court, to provide its outgoing CEO with a
generous “soft landing,” including millions in annual payments and a two-year consulting
contract to “retain the critical knowledge and insight of the waste-to-energy business that [the
CEO] possesses.”234 This agreement, cut between an outgoing CEO and motivated owners who
were not captured by the CEO, is typical of post-distress contracting.
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2. Example case study – New CEO of WorldCom
The employment contract of WorldCom’s CEO Michael Capellas provides a nice case
study illustrating the resiliency of employment contract terms in the face of enhanced scrutiny.
Prior to Capellas’s arrival at the end of 2002, WorldCom collapsed from one of the world’s
leading telecommunications firms into Chapter 11 (with over $100 billion in assets, the largest
bankruptcy in history). The fall was reported ubiquitously and continuously for months, as
thousands lost their jobs, shareholders were wiped out, and the details of the accounting scandals
and the excesses of former Chairman and CEO Bernie Ebbers were uncovered. Ebbers, who built
the firm from nothing into a hundred-billion-dollar behemoth through a series of bold
acquisitions, received annual compensation in the tens of millions of dollars, and borrowed over
$400 million from WorldCom to fund everything from share purchases to a boat building
business. In the wake of the collapse, the Department of Justice, the SEC, and numerous state
attorneys general launched civil and criminal investigations. As a result of these investigations,
numerous former employees have been sentenced to prison and millions of dollars in fines have
been levied.
In Chapter 11, WorldCom (acting as debtor in possession) recruited Capellas, then
president of Hewlett Packard, to be the new CEO. At the time, WorldCom’s fate was being
largely controlled by a bank syndicate that had agreed to loan the debtor about $2 billion in
additional funding under a revolving credit facility, and by a group of vulture investors, who
took large, blocking positions in WorldCom and MCI bonds. These creditors were active in
personnel decisions, evaluating business strategy, and disposing of assets, as well as developing
a reorganization plan. In addition to creditor oversight, WorldCom’s significant actions were
subject to the approval of former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, who was appointed as a
“Corporate Monitor” by the federal bankruptcy court overseeing the reorganization. Breeden
issued an eponymous report on WorldCom’s corporate governance that contained 78 specific
recommendations that WorldCom had to implement as a precondition to emerging from Chapter
11.235 The enormous public scrutiny, creditor involvement, and unprecedented judicial oversight
made the WorldCom reorganization an extreme example of the reduced agency costs model
described above.
It was in this environment that the debtor and its owners negotiated an employment
agreement with new CEO Capellas. The original contract was submitted for review by the court
(both the U.S. District Court and U.S. Bankruptcy Court sitting together) and the Corporate
Monitor, and was rejected on the grounds that the amount of pay was excessive. Breeden then
negotiated a revised agreement that reduced the amount of pay by about 25 percent, and this
contract was approved by the courts.236 The final contract, which was therefore subject to
creditor, Corporate Monitor, and judicial approval, is substantially the same in structure and
basic terms as contracts in healthy firms and pre- and post-distress debtors in this sample. The
contract has the following key characteristics: (a) a three-year term; (b) a fixed salary that cannot
be reduced; (c) a guaranteed bonus for the first two years (during the expected period of
235

See Restoring Trust: Corporate Governance for the Future of MCI, Inc., (Breeden Report), available at
http://www.corplawblog.com/archives/000181.html.
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Despite the reduction, Capellas was still scheduled to earn in excess of $20 million over three years to turn around
WorldCom. See Larry Neumeister, CEO to earn $22 million for WorldCom rescue, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 17, 2002, available at
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2002/Dec/17/bz/bz10a.html.
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reorganization) and a performance-based bonus (after emergence) determined by specified,
objective financial criteria; (d) grant of millions of dollars of non-indexed, at-the-money options
with a 3-year vesting period and 10-year term; (e) grant of millions of dollars in restricted stock;
(f) generous severance provisions in the event of a change of control.237 So even under these
extreme circumstances, we see substantially similar contractual terms being written as for firms
in general. If anything, the Capellas contract, following from the Breeden Report, relies more
heavily on restricted stock than typical contracts, a fact corporate critics would surely point to as
evidence of excessive managerial power but for the unprecedented oversight in this case.
***
We thus see employment agreements written in low agency cost environments that look
substantially the same along key dimensions as those written in higher agency cost settings. The
general structure of the agreements is the same, payment of cash compensation and equity are
made in the same way, and retirement packages are constructed of similar terms. This supports
the view that the contracts we observe are the best that we can expect – they can either be said to
be the product of arm’s-length bargaining or the best any owners (short of the theoretical 100
percent owner) are likely to write. Let us turn now from the manner to the amount of
compensation to see if this further supports the efficiency claim.
D. Compensation levels in financially distressed firms
The data shows that firms actively renegotiated key elements of compensation, frequently
reducing salaries, bonuses, and option grants. That being said, about 33 percent of firms made no
changes in compensation levels, and another 25 percent made changes to only one element of the
compensation mix (e.g., shifting the compensation mix from cash-rich to equity-rich). Those
firms that did reduce compensation at some point around distress tended to increase it after the
financial clouds lifted, suggesting performance-related adjustments. Since compensation is
typically broken down into two components – cash and equity (including options, LTIP, and so
on) – we will consider each type in turn, by comparing compensation levels in the periods
before, during, and after distress.238
1. Cash compensation
Comparing the average total cash compensation in pre-distress and post-distress periods,
the median change was an increase of 13 percent, with almost 70 percent of firms increasing or
keeping total cash compensation the same. (The results are roughly the same for the subset of
firms with the same CEO, with increases of 20-30% in the post-distress period.) The amount
firms pay cash compensation in the shadow of Chapter 11 is shown in Figure X. Generalizing
from this pattern, we can see that in the years prior to significant financial distress (-4 to -3) but
237

See Terms and Conditions of Employment of Michael D. Capellas and WorldCom, Inc., Dec. 2, 2002, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/120902cpllswcmk.pdf. The contract, in accord with the Breeden Report, did limit
the maximum amount of compensation in any year to $15 million without shareholder approval and limit severance payments to
$10 million. See Breeden Report, supra note 235.
238
The four years prior to the triggering event are designated -4 to -1, while the period after filing is designated 0 to 4. The
average time a firm spends in Chapter 11 is about 18 months, but the increased monitoring of outside investors starts before the
firm files for reorganization and continues after the firm emerges from Chapter 11. In the typical case, creditors begin to exert
influence six months to one year prior to the firm filing for Chapter 11, although the intensity of the monitoring role increases as
bankruptcy approaches. After bankruptcy, firms that emerge as new public firms often have a board appointed by or with several
members from the distressed debt investors.
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while the firm is still underperforming, firms modestly increase cash compensation in order to
keep pace with inflation and to provide sufficient levels to attract and retain talented managers.
As the firm faces the threat of bankruptcy, cash compensation remains flat or is slightly reduced.
Over 40 percent of the firms reduced cash compensation in the two years preceding a distress
event (-2 to 0).239 Firms then increase cash compensation as they emerge from bankruptcy (year
1), usually in the form of a cash bonus payable on the successful emergence of the firm from
bankruptcy. Pay then remains flat, on average, for the next few years, before rising substantially,
perhaps when fortunes rise for the firm when bankruptcy is left far behind or perhaps when firms
that have remained in bankruptcy beyond the typical one to two years emerge and pay bonuses
tied to a successful reorganization plan.

This result is generally consistent with the data from the prior ten years,240 and is what
one would expect. Firms are most likely to reduce cash compensation in the several years leading
up to Chapter 11 or private workout as performance falls and the firm faces cash constraints,
increased monitoring, and higher outrage costs. Firms may also want to change the compensation
mix to reduce cash in favor of incentive compensation to motivate CEOs. The decrease as a
result of lower performance is consistent with fact that most CEO employment contracts, which
are still enforceable in the shadow of Chapter 11, provide for a fixed salary with a variable bonus
pegged to various performance metrics. The data support this conclusion – the average salary
component of cash compensation was 8 percent higher in firms that experienced financial
distress at some point during this ten-year period, while the average bonus component was 45
percent lower.241 Outrage is likely the highest as a firm approaches and enters bankruptcy, and, at
first glance, the data support that intuition.242
239

This conclusion is consistent with the prior work of Gilson & Vetsuypens, who found that “firms systematically restructure
their management compensation contracts when they experience severe financial difficulty.” Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 7,
at 438. The changes in compensation levels are not dramatic (modest decreases in salaries and, more often, bonuses) but are real,
and suggest that firms are facing the issue of executive compensation as part of their dealing with the impact of financial distress.
240
Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 7, at 434-5.
241
Average salary for healthy firms was about $600,000 per year, and for distressed firms $650,000 per year; average annual
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Perhaps somewhat surprising is the fact that only about one-third of firms reduce cash
compensation during the one or two years the firm is in Chapter 11. There are several possible
explanations for this observation. First, wage levels may have already fallen to at or near the
CEO’s reservation price, that is, the level below which compensation would be insufficient to
keep and motivate the CEO. Second, some firms may actually increase cash compensation in
Chapter 11 to compensate for the loss in value of stock option wealth as shareholders go to the
back of the creditors’ line. Finally, the firms resetting cash compensation in Chapter 11 are
typically not those that made changes in the run up to the filing of the petition. Thus, the firms
reducing compensation in the period 0-2 are merely responding to a different set of pressures and
incentives than the firms that reset compensation levels in the period –4 to 0. In order to get a
better picture, let us look at the components of cash compensation.
a. Salary
A CEO’s base salary is routinely a fixed amount payable regardless of firm performance.
Base salaries are not typically renegotiated at any time during the duration of the employment
agreement, even when the amount is objectively undeserved – a policy called “no cut”
contracts.243 This is because salaries are contractually guaranteed, making the CEO’s bargaining
position quite strong. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that firms and executives view
salary as the reservation wage or bare minimum required to secure the CEO’s services for a
given period. Any amount below the fixed salary would mean losing the executive and possibly
generating costly litigation. Finally, as the managerial power theorists suggest, the CEO likely
has some power over the board with respect to compensation negotiations, and the board is,
given these costs, unlikely to challenge a CEO on the contractually agreed upon terms.
As we have seen, however, when the firm files for Chapter 11, the barriers that prohibit
recontracting over salary levels go away.244 We therefore see reductions in CEO base pay as
creditors tear up executory employment agreements and rewrite new ones. This happened in
nearly all of the cases in this dataset.245 The average firm increased salary levels slightly from
pre-distress levels, suggesting salary levels were not excessive in most cases. The salary
increases outside of the shadow of bankruptcy (before filing in years –4 to –3; and after
emergence in years 1 to 4) are similar to the average 3 to 5 percentage point increases for large
firms during the study period, according to the Corporate Library.246 Thus if we take out the
bonus was $450,000 per year for healthy firms, and $250,000 for distressed firms. The net result is that cash compensation in
distressed firms was about 20 percent lower than in healthy firms.
242
An alternative explanation for the decrease in cash compensation is that powerful managers tweak salaries and bonuses
slightly to reduce outrage, knowing full well that compensation levels will return to “normal” once the specter of bankruptcy is
lifted. This explanation does not hold water, as discussed in section IV.A.2.
243
Contracts often allow for increases but not decreases in salary levels. See, e.g., Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc. 10-K
(May 1, 2002) (“The initial annual salaries for [the CEO is] $755,000 . . ., to be reviewed annually, and may be increased, but not
decreased, by the Compensation Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors.”)
244
These barriers are reduced somewhat when an employment contract ends, and firms take advantage of these reduced costs to
renegotiate in some instances. See Company News, Coca-Cola Chief To Be Paid Less Than Predecessor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2004, at B4 (new CEO salary and bonus reduced to $4.5 million from $5.5 million for predecessor). Chapter 11 not only
terminates every contract regardless of its term, but also reduces other recontracting costs.
245
See, e.g., Covanta Energy, 10-K, filed Mar. 30, 2004: “Prior to the Company’s emergence from the Chapter 11 cases, it
formally rejected all of the prepetition employment contracts covering the executive officers named in the compensation tables.”
246
See Erin White & Kris Maher, Please, Sir, A Bit More?, WALL ST. J., October, 26, 2004, at B1.
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period immediately prior to filing and the time firms spend in Chapter 11, the picture is one in
which distressed firms largely mimic the compensation patterns of healthy firms.
Looking firm by firm, we see that about 80 percent of firms increased their compensation
in the period after distress or kept it the same compared with pre-distress levels: 18 increased
compensation an average of 32 percent (median = 25%); 14 kept the salaries the same before and
after distress. Ten firms wrote a new contract that reduced the average CEO salary compared
with pre-distress levels. The average reduction for these firms was about 25 percent (median =
22%). Most of these firms emerged in 2002 and 2003, however, when CEO pay decreased on
average for all firms in the Fortune 500 by about 8 percent.247 This market-wide decrease in CEO
pays lessens the size of the 25 percent average decrease for the ten firms lowering CEO salaries.
The change in salary (plus and minus) for these firms was not caused by firm
performance – in all cases revenue, profitability, and market return data were all negative for
these firms over the periods in question. In addition, a regression of salary levels against these
potential explanatory variables – sales, net income, return on assets, TRS, and a dummy variable
for a new CEO – shows that they are all insignificant (p value > 0.005) at the 95 percent
confidence level. A regression of year-to-year salary changes against the year-to-year changes in
these variables also shows they are insignificant.
To isolate the variability introduced by the change of CEO, consider the subset of firms
(N=12) that kept the same CEO during the entire study period. The data for these firms mirrors
that for all firms in the sample, with average salary in post-distress years being about 5 percent
higher than pre-distress. This suggests that the hiring of a new CEO, either from inside or outside
the firm, does not have a big impact on the conclusion. This is also supported by the regression,
as noted above.
While the vast majority of firms kept their compensation the same or increased it in the
period after distress, the fact that ten firms did lower salaries suggests some recontracting did
take place. This data squares with the theory outlined above, with creditors increasing monitoring
and causing some firms to reduce compensation levels. The rarity of changes also suggests that
salary is basically off the table in terms of renegotiations for most firms for the reasons outlined
above. Let us now look more closely at bonus levels.
b. Bonus
All of the firms in the dataset had discretionary bonus programs, which are, on average,
about 50 percent of an executive’s cash compensation in a given year. The bonuses are typically
paid in a year-end lump sum, and the algorithm for calculating the amount is contractually
specified. In nearly all cases, the bonus is a multiple of the employee’s salary (ranging from 0.5
to 2 times),248 and is linked to an objective measure of firm performance, such as earnings per
share.

247
248

Patrick McGeehan, Is CEO Pay Up or Down? Both, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at § 3, 1.
Bonuses were guaranteed in about 10 percent of the firms in the sample.
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As expected, we see bonuses fall in and around financial distress due to the decrease in
firm performance. Bonuses also rise significantly in the first years after filing Chapter 11
because firms routinely pay “emergence bonuses” when the firm restructures its debt. These
bonuses are negotiated with the creditors’ committee or bank consortium providing DIP
financing, and are included in KERPs or revised employment agreements. In addition, the
bankruptcy court overseeing the reorganization approves all of these bonus programs. The
average emergence bonus in the dataset was approximately the average bonus for the executive
in one or two prior years, and is usually equal to about one times annual salary.249 In other words,
an executive’s bonus during the one or two years of reorganization is deferred until after the firm
successfully reorganizes. This is a sensible strategy on the part of the creditors (and the firm)
since it prevents the CEO from cheating in a final period by allowing the firm to verify
performance.
In order to control somewhat for the impact of firm performance and emergence bonuses,
we can compare bonus levels several years prior to distress (say, -6 to –3) with post distress
bonus levels (say, +2 to +4). The data shows that firms did not dramatically reduce the amount of
discretionary bonuses paid post-distress. The median change was a 19 percent increase compared
with pre-distress levels. About 80 percent of firms increased or kept bonus levels the same: 24
increased bonuses an average of over 200 percent, while 9 kept levels the same. Eleven firms did
reduce bonuses, by an average of about 50 percent. In each of these cases, however, firm
performance was a potential explanatory factor. A simple regression of bonus levels against
metrics of firm performance shows that a firm’s return on assets is a significant explanatory
factor (p value << 0.005) at the 95 percent confidence level. This is supported by the fact that
three of these firms remained in Chapter 11 during the entire duration of the study period.
Another control is, as above, looking at firms with the same CEO over the entire period.
The potential impact of an outgoing and incoming CEO can have on bonus data is substantial
since firms might be expected to give outgoing CEOs a “soft landing” or “golden goodbye” and
incoming CEOs a “golden handshake.” The data for these firms, however, corroborates the data
from the broader dataset, with the mean and median bonuses rising similarly in the post-distress
period.
The bottom line on bonus levels is that they are renegotiated with creditors and approved
by the court, like salaries are, and that they look very much the same post-distress as they do predistress. In other words, the employment contracts that the sophisticated, nearly 100-percent
owners write for the firm going forward are quite similar to those written when managers were
more firmly in control.

249

For example, in the reorganization of Fruit of the Loom, the debtor disclosed the following about its emergence bonus:
The Bankruptcy Court also approved a retention plan for key employees,
including executive officers. Pursuant to such order, executive officers, other than [the CEO], receive
retention and emergence payments equal to 65% to 80% of their base pay. [The CEO] is entitled to receive an
emergence bonus equal to $800,000.
This was approximately the CEO’s annual salary and bonus level prior to distress.
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2. Equity compensation
The other major component of CEO compensation is equity compensation. During the
period of study, the largest part of the compensation mix was non-cash compensation, usually in
the form of restricted stock and/or stock options of various forms. While distressed firms paid
less of their total compensation in stock options than healthy firms, options still composed 50 to
60 percent of total compensation on average.
The decision to use of options in an around bankruptcy is complicated by a variety of
factors. On the one hand, stock options should have great appeal to firms in financial distress,
because if used correctly, they are a seemingly cashless way for firms to provide high-powered
incentives to management to improve the firm’s performance. Options are also the accepted
method for motivating managers and aligning principal and agent risk profiles, things that are
increasingly important as a firm struggles to reorganize its debt and turn around its business
prospects.
On the other hand, options will be worth less to the executive as the firm’s fortune, and
thus its stock price, falls, and therefore the cost of issuing the options (for example, dilution
costs) may outweigh their incentive effects. Options are also an inefficient way to pay managers
of firms in financial distress since “firms whose top management face substantial risk, due to
either manager’s equity holdings or firm riskiness, receive diminishing benefits from imposing
further risk bearing through compensation contracts.”250 Options granted at this time also may be
imposing excessive risk upon managers, because of the diminishing marginal benefit of riskincreasing compensation methods in already risky circumstances.251 In addition, as the
probability of bankruptcy becomes more certain, any stock options will become effectively
worthless because shareholders are bound to be wiped out after the firm reorganizes. Finally,
firms with fewer growth opportunities and whose investment decisions are easier to monitor –
both of which are true for distressed firms – should be expected to use less incentive
compensation.252
In terms of amount, the median firm increased the average value of stock option grants 8
percent in post-distress contracts compared with the average in pre-distress periods.253 (The value
of stock options, calculated using the Black-Scholes option pricing formula, was taken from the
EXECUCOMP database along with the other data.) The same findings are true for firms that did
not change CEOs during the relevant period. Comparing pre-distress and post-distress contracts,
about 60 percent of firms increased or kept the same the value of options granted to their CEOs.
Of those firms that did reduce the value of options granted, about half granted some options
(reducing the amount by an average of about 50%) while the other half had reductions of 100
percent – that is, they granted no options at all during the time of the study. This complete
reduction was not a repudiation of options as a compensation mechanism or necessarily a
rejection of the amount of pre-distress grants, but rather is explained by the fact that the firms
250
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Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 7, at 434-5.
Beatty & Zajac, supra note 115, at 327.
See Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593 (1988).
EXECUCOMP category “BLK_VALU,” which is the Black-Scholes value of options granted.
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remained in bankruptcy, were in the process of completing a liquidation or merger with another
firm, or were operating with a CRO who did not get an equity stake as part of a short-term
contract. Therefore, less than 20 percent of firms reduced the value of options granted in postdistress periods for reasons unrelated to Chapter 11 processes. Moreover, the decrease for these
firms may be explained more by their performance than by a change in bargaining power – TRS
for firms decreasing option values is a significant explanatory variable at the 95 percent
confidence level and was almost 10 times worse than for firms that increased or kept values the
same, holding other potential variables, such as sales, net income, CEO identity, and return on
assets, constant.
Since the value of options may be impacted by the decline in stock price prior to or
during bankruptcy, another way to get additional insight into this question is to look at the total
number of options granted as opposed to the Black-Scholes value of the options as issued. If we
compare the average number of options granted in the two years prior to bankruptcy (-2 to -1),
with the average number granted in the prior years, we find that about 70 percent of the firms
substantially increased the number of options granted to the CEO in the shadow of bankruptcy.
While one might think that this is can simply be explained by the fact that a decreasing
stock price requires the firm to increase the number of options to achieve the same compensation
level or incentive effects, the data does not support that conclusion. The magnitude of the
increase in the number of options granted dwarfs any decrease in the stock of these distressed
firms. For the firms that increased the number of options granted to the CEO, the increases were
far greater than required to offset any decrease in stock price – the mean increase was about 30
times and the median increase was almost 3 times prior levels, far more than needed to offset
price declines.254 In fact, the reported value of stock options issued on the eve of, or in,
bankruptcy is on average three times greater than options issued in prior years. It is unlikely that
the firm’s owners – inevitably at this point the creditors – would want to impose additional risk
taking incentives on managers. But shareholders, including directors, may want precisely this
“bet the company” approach as the firm teeters on the edge of bankruptcy.
Several other explanations are also possible. The most obvious is that large options are
paid to attract outsiders to be CEO of a distressed firm. The data supports this hypothesis to a
certain extent, since in about half of the cases the increase was given to a new CEO in his first or
second year on the job. In these cases, the grant may be designed to align shareholder-manager
incentives by giving the new CEO some skin in the game, so to speak. Firms usually set target
ownership levels of firm stock or give substantial option grants to try to better align executives’
financial incentives with that of shareholder value. With a failing firm, giving options is a less
costly way for the firm to meet ownership targets because it does not require the new CEO to
alter her portfolio, and spend real money, to purchase shares that are falling and may soon be
worthless. Giving options thus achieves a similar incentive effect without imposing a costly
portfolio rebalancing cost on a new executive, that is, already increasing her risk profile by
putting her human capital into a faltering firm. In addition, a large grant may be required to
match the market wage for CEO talent. Here again, options are a less costly way to meet the
CEO’s reservation price, because paying large amounts in salary or other cash consideration may
254

The mean and median for the few firms reducing the number of stock options was about one half prior levels.
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put pressure on already tight working capital constraints and may also generate significant
outrage costs.
This explanation is not complete, however, because in over half the firms, huge option
grants in the shadow of bankruptcy were given to existing CEOs who stayed on during part or all
of the reorganization. Several other possibilities are evident. First, shareholders are trying to
reincentivize managers whose (under-water) options no longer provide the right risk-taking
motivation.255 For the reasons noted above, this is an unlikely explanation given the large
difference between the value of stock options granted on the eve of bankruptcy and the years
before distress.
The second possibility is that shareholders are trying to align their incentives with those
of management, who they know will owe fiduciary duties to creditors, not shareholders, once the
firm approaches bankruptcy. The theory is simple: executives with substantial equity positions
may act to preserve recovery for shareholders (i.e., themselves) at the expense of creditors.256
This attempt to buy managerial loyalty is not implausible since, “in some cases, [executives]
openly embrace the idea that their duty lies with the shareholders.”257 Several studies support the
attempt by shareholders, finding “Chapter 11 often enables equityholders to obtain a share of the
value of the reorganized company even when that value is less than sufficient to cover
debtholders’ claims.”258
If this is the strategy of shareholders, it is unlikely to work well or as intended. Creditors
can easily buy out this bribe through a severance package (if the CEO leaves) or rolling it into
future compensation (if CEO stays).259 Shareholders and the CEO are likely know this, so a more
plausible explanation is that this is an attempt to raise CEO exit costs (either for creditors or for
other firms, both of who typically make CEOs whole upon their departure).260 One of many
examples of this is from debtor Allegheny Energy whose new CEO “received an initial makewhole payment of $6,300,000 to compensate him for forfeitures of financial and other benefits
from his former employer.”261 Therefore, these awards could be either a rational decision by the
255

See Cieri & Riela, supra note 162, at 301 (“Arguably, with an insolvent corporation, its shareholders would prefer that
directors and officers take the corporate assets and ‘go to Las Vegas’: using the assets in extremely risky ventures that have a
high probability of failure, but hold even the smallest possibility of astounding success.”).
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Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, 46 J. FIN. 297, 300 (1991)
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ROSENBERG, supra note 60, at 51.
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Lucian A. Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 253, 255 (1992) (citing Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J.
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See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, at 689.
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See Valerie Patterson, Employment Contracts Attract Top Executives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1998, available at
http://www.careerjournal.com/myc/negotiate/19980915-patterson.html (noting that “[u]pfront award[s] often [are] designed to
motivate executives to leave the perks, expected stock option awards and bonuses from their current firms and make a move.”);
see also Joann S. Lublin, Should Financial Turmoil Force You Out of a Company?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2004, available at
http://www.careerjournal.com/columnists/manageyourcareer/20041110-managingyourcareer.html (observing that the “next
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See Allegheny Energy Proxy Statement Form 14A, April 8, 2004 at 36.
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firm – to raise the cost of external poaching of CEO or resetting risk-taking incentives – or a
suspect, self-awarded payment at the expense of the firm and its creditors. Others have examined
the question of timing option grants to take advantage of favorable market news,262 and this is
just the flip side of that argument – timing option grants to raise exit costs before bad news. In
any case, the possibility of expropriation by managers is significant enough that bankruptcy
courts should look with greater scrutiny at pre-filing option grants. David Skeel has recently
proposed an expansion of existing fraudulent conveyance practice by trustees and bankruptcy
courts, suggesting that “[e]xecutives should be forced to disgorge the proceeds of any stock sales
they make within eighteen months of bankruptcy.”263 A sensible reform goes a step further, by
calling not just stock sales but option grants into question, and extending the fraudulent
conveyance “look back” period long enough to capture specious grants. These large option
grants may have escaped attention up until now because the value of options granted on the eve
of bankruptcy falls as the stock drops. But with firms (either current or new) buying out option
packages at grant value, the possibility for abuse is real.
3. Total compensation
Turning finally to the total compensation package, which includes the current value of all
payments present or future for the executive awarded in any year, we see a similar pattern with
about three-quarters of firms increasing or keeping average post-distress compensation levels the
same as pre-distress. The median change is an increase of 12 percent.264 (The increase is the same
for the subset of firms that did not change CEO. The basic regression also supports the
conclusion that the change is not driven by the presence of a new CEO, as the dummy variable of
a new CEO is insignificant. The change is therefore not likely the result of buying off the
outgoing CEO or bribing the incoming CEO at levels above the exogenously set market wage.)
The big-picture pattern is quite similar to the cash compensation data shown in Figure X.
In the pre-distress years, where the firms may be underperforming but are not facing an acute
financial crisis, around 30 percent of firms reduce total compensation in any given year, and we
might think of this as a natural or equilibrium level for firms in this situation. As bankruptcy
comes and creditors take an active role in monitoring the firm, however, over half of the firms
reduced their use of stock options in any given year. In fact, over the four-year period that we
might call the “shadow of bankruptcy” (-2 to +2), over 75 percent of all firms reduced the total
compensation at least once. But compensation levels return to the pre-distress equilibrium levels
after emerging from the shadow of bankruptcy, with no fundamental, long-term shift in total
compensation amounts.
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The problem of CEOs timing option grants in self-interested, and shareholder value destroying ways, was recently
considered in Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835 (2004).
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incentive payments, and all other total.”
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VI. CONCLUSION

Contrary to some standard accounts of bankruptcy, capital providers and other creditors
wield significant influence over debtors in Chapter 11, including key management decisions over
issues like executive compensation. This power is derived from contractual covenants contained
in typical DIP financing, as well as the statutory powers granted by the Bankruptcy Code and the
customary rules of creditors’ committee practice. These latter powers have dramatically
increased as a result of the growth in the distressed debt market that allows so-called “vulture
investors” to acquire blocking positions enabling them to virtually control the corporation in
bankruptcy.
As a result, and again contrary to the conventional wisdom, the pay setting process for
senior executives in Chapter 11 functions reasonably well, or as well as can be expected. The
power of managers and the firm are fairly equal and there is evidence that the parties actually
dicker over compensation terms and amounts. Therefore, recent reforms limiting executive pay
in bankruptcy are largely misplaced. One caveat is needed, however, with respect to pre-petition
option grants. The data show disproportionately large grants to CEOs in the two years leading up
to Chapter 11 that might be better explained by a self-serving attempt to increase severance
payments or to get “golden handshake” payments from a new employer, than by sincere attempts
at realigning incentives or reducing poaching by increasing exit costs. Courts should give these
grants additional scrutiny. During the several years leading up to bankruptcy creditors are not yet
closely monitoring the firm (fiduciary duties have not yet switched) and external forces may not
be providing the disciplinary constraint required in such a final period for the executive and
(perhaps) the firm.
The compensation data (both form and amount) from about 80 firms that restructured
their debt during the past ten years also sheds some light on the ongoing debate about whether
existing compensation practices in healthy firms can be better explained by excessive managerial
power or arm’s-length contracting. As we have seen, agency costs are greatly reduced in Chapter
11 because of the increased monitoring role of creditors and the oversight provided by courts and
other stakeholders. Compensation negotiations are therefore largely freed from the taint of
alleged managerial power that critics say corrupts negotiations in healthy firms. And yet, in the
absence of high agency costs and clear managerial power, compensation practices are largely the
same as they are in pre-distress periods and in healthy firms. In other words, when sophisticated
creditors (who are spending their own money) write employment agreements from scratch, they
look just like those written by firms with more diverse ownership interests.
This does not necessarily prove that existing contracting practices are efficient, but it
does suggest, at the very least, that these contracts are the best we can expect, even if the reforms
of managerial power advocates are implemented. These monitors are likely to be less effective at
writing employment agreements or policing compensation practices than creditors in bankruptcy,
since this latter group will have larger ownership stakes, greater statutory and customary rights,
better information and access to corporate decision makers, and a more powerful negotiation
position. If these creditors are unwilling or unable to fix compensation practices, we can
conclude that the compensation system isn’t broken or that none of the proposed corporate
governance changes is likely to make any substantive difference to executive compensation
methods or amounts.
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